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INTRODUCTION 
Remorse and apology are powerful forces in everyday life. Parents 
make their children apologize for everyday wrongs. “I’m sorry” is a 
common expression, and confession and forgiveness loom large in both 
religious rituals and secular reconciliation. When a politician does 
something wrong, “a simple, direct apology is often the one thing voters 
most want to hear.”1 Thus, political leaders either apologize for everything 
from sexual indiscretions to historic injustices or else are criticized for not 
apologizing enough.2 People value remorse and apology because they heal 
psychic wounds, teach lessons, and reconcile damaged relationships. 
Remorse and apology should also loom large in the criminal arena, 
where victims’ wounds are the greatest and need the most healing. Victims 
and victimized communities have long viewed remorse and apology as 
essential elements of justice for crimes. For example, one victim who was 
sexually abused by a priest demanded expressions of remorse to help him 
find closure and heal.3 Like so many others, however, he had to file a civil 
lawsuit to seek justice and apology, as he had received none from the 
criminal justice system. In another case, a driver ran over a man in a hit-
and-run accident and left him in a coma. The driver’s lawyer discouraged 
her from apologizing for fear of prejudicing her criminal case. Eight months 
after the accident, the driver said she was sorry for what had happened but 
did not acknowledge her role. The brief, belated non-apology left the 
victim’s family dissatisfied and frustrated.4 
When criminal justice does produce remorse, the effects can be 
profound. When victims’ relatives confronted serial killer Gary Leon 
 
1. David Firestone, Being a Politician Means Never Having To Say You’re Sorry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2. 
2. Firestone quotes apologies by a former South Korean president for abuse of power (“It is 
more than unbearable for me to face you and make this confession of my shameful deeds, and I 
deeply apologize . . . . The scar will be forever with me in my heart for the people who have 
suffered, and for this I feel more regret than I can express.”) and former President George H.W. 
Bush (“The internment of Americans of Japanese ancestry was a great injustice . . . and it will 
never be repeated.”). Id. He also notes that President “Clinton’s inability to use any form of the 
word ‘apologize’ last week in his speech to the nation about his affair with Monica S. Lewinsky 
was the aspect of his remarks that was most criticized the next day.” Id. 
3. Michael S. Rosenwald, Alleged Victim Demands Apology from Monsignor, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2002, at A16 (noting that victim “said he will feel closure—and the Catholic 
Church will begin to heal—only when [the alleged abuser] and other accused clergy publicly take 
full responsibility for their actions and apologize”). 
4. Robin Topping, Attorneys Balance ‘Safe’ with ‘Sorry,’ NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 4, 2004, at 
A22 (noting that while victims “‘first and foremost’” want apologies, “‘the [defense] lawyer’s 
position always is to not make admissions of any kind’” for fear of hurting the criminal case, or at 
most to issue a non-apology “‘saying you are sorry that this tragedy occurred, which is not an 
admission,’” quoting a sociology professor and two prominent criminal defense attorneys, 
respectively). 
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Ridgway at sentencing, they sobbed and poured out their anger and loss. 
The judge expressed the community’s moral condemnation and spoke of 
bringing peace and closure. In return, Ridgway expressed sorrow and 
apologized, and at least one victim’s relative forgave him and expressed a 
feeling of peace.5 Ridgway’s remorse and apology were no substitute for 
punishment, but they helped to begin the healing process. 
Surprisingly, however, remorse and apology play little role in criminal 
procedure. Our criminal justice system works as a speedy assembly line: It 
plea bargains cases efficiently and maximizes punishment for the limited 
resources available. This assembly line leaves little room for remorse and 
apology. At most, they creep in interstitially, as indicators that individual 
defendants are less bad and so need less deterrence, incapacitation, or 
retribution. We will call this defendant-centered approach to remorse and 
apology the “individual badness model.” As we show in Part I, this 
approach dominates existing judicial decisions, such as cases applying 
section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,6 as well as the 
academic literature.7 
We dispute this conventional approach. Remorse and apology could do 
much more than serve as gauges of an individual defendant’s need for 
punishment. Remorse and apology are fundamentally about social 
interactions and relationships. Serious wrongdoers sometimes apologize not 
only to the direct victim, but also to everyone who suffered indirect harm, 
such as members of the victim’s family and community. Victims, in return, 
can air their sorrows while expressing forgiveness to the wrongdoer. 
 
5. Gene Johnson, ‘Green River Killer’ Apologizes, Is Sentenced to 48 Life Terms, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2003, at A12; see also, e.g., John Donnelly, Appealing for Forgiveness: Ex-
Convicts Reach Out to Victims in South Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2003, at A1; Oliver 
Duff, Sidebar, in Kathy Marks & Paul Peachey, Traditional Maori Ways Translate to a New Style 
of Justice in Britain, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 25, 2003, at 3 (“[The offender] . . . credits [a 
face to face meeting with the victim] with saving him from further trouble. ‘It was only when I 
shook hands with him that I really felt sorry for what I’d done. . . . [T]hat was a big deal for us.’”); 
Grant Wahl & L. Jon Wertheim, A Rite Gone Terribly Wrong, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 22, 
2003, at 68, 77 (“[T]he classic bully[] broke down and cried while saying he was sorry for what 
he had done to the [hazing victims]. ‘I know it sounds silly,’ says Kelly, the attorney for two of 
the victims, ‘but [his apology] meant something to the families.’”) (last alteration in original). 
6. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (2003) (providing two- or 
three-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility). 
7. Up through the mid-1990s, the literature contained almost no substantial discussions of the 
role of remorse and apology in the criminal justice system on any but the most abstract level. 
Michael O’Hear’s 1997 article marked the first serious attempt to examine how on-the-ground 
rules and practices in criminal law treat expressions of remorse and contrition in administering 
criminal punishment. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of 
Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507 (1997). Since that time, remorse, apology, and 
related concepts have attracted the attention of prominent scholars in the field. See infra Section 
I.C. The last half-decade has also witnessed an explosion of writing on the topics in the civil law 
arena. See, e.g., sources cited infra Subsection II.B.3. 
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Ideally, this interactive process teaches moral lessons, brings catharsis, and 
reconciles and heals offenders, victims, and society. We will call this multi-
actor perspective the “relational approach” to distinguish it from the 
defendant-focused individual badness model.8 
The individualism of the badness model parallels the criminal law’s 
individualistic approach to punishment. Traditionally, criminal law has 
focused on deterring, incapacitating, rehabilitating, and inflicting retribution 
on individual defendants. This focus has come at the expense of the broader 
social dimension of punishment. Recently, academics have begun 
theorizing about incorporating moral education, healing, reconciliation, and 
victim vindication more directly into criminal law.9 Unfortunately, criminal 
procedure is artificially divorced from these substantive values of the 
criminal law, focusing instead on accuracy, efficiency, and procedural 
fairness.10 Thus, criminal procedure leaves little room for apology and 
remorse. What room exists is artificial, such as the more or less automatic 
sentencing discount for guilty pleas in federal court regardless of how 
contrite a defendant is.11  
In short, criminal procedure neglects the power of remorse and 
apology. To remedy this neglect, we must focus not just on the individual 
defendant’s supposed badness, but also on the social practices and norms of 
remorse and apology. Remorse and apology are useful as more than mere 
 
8. In practice, the distinction is not always a neat dichotomy. For example, sentencers who 
focus on the remorse and apology of individual offenders in meting out punishment also care 
about the effects of these expressions on victims and the community. Likewise, victims and 
communities who value remorse and apology for their cathartic and expressive power also 
frequently see them as relevant to determining sentences. The two approaches we identify shade 
into each other, but this does nothing to undermine our central claim that the individual badness 
model has dominated the criminal justice system’s stance toward remorse and apology so far. 
Our relational model also contains aspects that the word “relational” does not fully capture; 
the model seeks to restore victims, to reconcile victims to offenders, to remediate harm, and to 
reintegrate offenders into society. For the sake of brevity, however, we use the single but inexact 
word “relational” to describe our model. In some fields, such as torts, “relational” implies a focus 
on only the plaintiff and defendant. Some might understand this focus to exclude the web of social 
relationships torn by the defendant’s conduct. When we use the word “relational,” we do not mean 
to limit our focus to the wrongdoer and the victim. While remorse and apology require at least 
these two parties, ideally they involve everyone affected directly or indirectly by the wrong. 
9. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
733, 762-75 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Shaming Punishments] (discussing the role of moral 
education in punishment); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 
1804-29 (1999) [hereinafter Garvey, Punishment as Atonement] (discussing how punishment 
should lead to atonement, reconciliation, and healing); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594-601 (1996) (stressing the importance of 
punishment as a way to express condemnation). 
10. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal 
Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362 
(2003).  
11. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1534-40 (describing how judges in most federal districts 
tend to award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to defendants who plead guilty and deny 
them to defendants who stand trial). 
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metrics for punishment. Apology, we argue, is a powerful ritual for 
offenders, victims, and communities, one that criminal procedure could 
facilitate by encouraging offenders to interact face to face with their 
victims. The focus would broaden beyond the individual offender’s badness 
to constructive measures to heal offenders, victims, and communities. 
Remorse and apology would teach offenders lessons, vindicate victims, and 
encourage communities to welcome wrongdoers back into the fold. Of 
course, not all offenders or victims would be able and willing to take part. 
But the available empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that many would 
and that those who did might reap dramatic benefits. Thus, criminal 
procedure would serve the criminal law’s substantive values instead of 
undercutting them.  
Before continuing, we should explain briefly what we mean by 
expressions of remorse and apology. We use these terms broadly and 
generally, as the law does, to include offenders’ expressions of contrition, 
sorrow, shame, repentance, and the like. While these other expressions are 
helpful, the core of an apology is “an expression of sorrow and regret.”12 
The offender should both feel sorry and express this sorrow,13 although, as 
Section III.F explains, even half-hearted or insincere apologies are better 
than nothing. At a minimum, apology is at least a dyadic relation and 
interaction, requiring an expression of sorrow by the offender to the victim 
or victims.14 Subsection II.B.2 delves further into the psychological 
mechanisms that make remorse and apology powerful tools for healing 
relationships. Our aim is to show how the criminal justice system’s 
ambivalent stance toward this cluster of practices obscures and undermines 
the key values that they serve. 
In Part I, we explore the role that remorse and apology currently play in 
criminal law. As Section I.A explains, criminal law views remorse and 
apology through the lens of the individual badness model, primarily as 
proxies for how bad an individual defendant is and how much punishment 
he or she needs. Section I.B shows that criminal procedure emphasizes the 
procedural values of fairness, efficiency, and accuracy at the expense of the 
substantive values espoused by the criminal law. Section I.C notes that, 
while academics have recently shown interest in remorse and apology, most 
try to fit these values into the individual badness model. In addition, few 
discuss how to implement these values through real-world institutions, 
policies, and procedures. 
 
12. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA 23 (1991).  
13. Id. at 31, 36.  
14. Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1139 (2000) (citing TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 46). 
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Part II explains why we should value remorse and apology more 
broadly. Section II.A discusses why remorse and apology are poor 
proxies—both practically and theoretically—for individual badness and the 
need for deterrence and retribution. While deterrence and retribution are 
legitimate guideposts for sentencing, they do not exhaust the roles of 
remorse and apology. Section II.B notes that remorse and apology are 
valuable for broader reasons than the individual badness model recognizes. 
Crime is more than individual wrongdoing; it is relational. Crime creates 
moral imbalances and sends false moral messages. Remorse and apology 
can help right the moral balance, annul false moral messages by vindicating 
victims, and reconcile offenders to their victims and communities. Section 
II.C ties these insights together. Remorse and apology are not substitutes 
for punishment in most cases, as the restorative justice movement 
mistakenly contends. Nor are they simply cheap, cruel ways of inflicting 
humiliation, as advocates of shaming punishments imply. Rather, they 
should be integral to criminal justice, supplementing but not supplanting 
deterrence and retribution. Remorse and apology neither displace nor justify 
punishment, but, as functions of punishment, they can better complement 
and serve its goals.  
Part III suggests how the law could translate these ideals into real-world 
procedures. Before and after arrest, and before and after charging decisions, 
offenders should have sufficient opportunities to resolve lower-level crimes 
informally by apologizing and making amends. From arrest through 
imprisonment, offenders and victims should have plenty of chances for 
court-supervised mediation. Prosecutors could make more use of remorse 
and apology to encourage offenders to cooperate with law enforcement and 
tell the truth. Victims and the community should have greater opportunities 
to participate at all stages in the criminal process, including mediation, 
restitution, plea, and trial. Plea and sentencing procedures should include 
explicit roles for remorse and apology. 
Part III ends with some caveats. These measures will not work for all 
crimes and are hardest to implement for victimless crimes or those with 
many victims. In addition, not all offenders or victims will be willing to 
take part, some apologies will be insincere, and some offenders will lack 
the mental capacity for remorse.15 Our proposals may seem idealistic to 
veterans of our efficient punishment assembly line. It will take time and 
effort to adapt the system to better focus on healing and reconciling victims 
and offenders. But when both sides are open to it—and, surprisingly often, 
they are—offenders, victims, and communities all stand to benefit. 
 
15. See infra Section III.F (discussing insincere apologies); infra Section III.G (discussing 
caveats).  
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I.  REMORSE, APOLOGY, AND CURRENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The criminal justice system is deeply ambivalent about remorse and 
apology. According to Austin Sarat, perhaps no expressions are more 
“universally welcomed within, and by, the legal system.”16 Judges, 
sentencing juries, the news media, and the public overwhelmingly weigh 
remorse heavily in disposing of criminal cases and in assessing offenders as 
persons. At the same time, criminal procedure does little to encourage or 
even allow meaningful apologies and expressions of remorse from 
offenders to their victims and the community. Remorse and apology often 
lurk in the interstices, appearing only as pro forma statements from 
defendants to judges at sentencing. Likewise, expressions of remorse and 
apology have received minor and incomplete treatment in the criminal law 
literature. Commentators tend to focus on practical and pragmatic issues 
raised by the current place of remorse and apology in the criminal justice 
system. They do not explore how remorse and apology could play a larger 
role in on-the-ground practices and institutions. 
In Sections A and B, we examine the criminal law’s uneasy relationship 
with expressions of remorse and apology. Section A explains that the 
substantive criminal law considers such expressions important mainly for 
what they are believed to say about an individual offender’s criminal 
disposition. Criminal procedure, however, does not reflect this emphasis, as 
we argue in Section B. Section C explores the place of remorse and apology 
in the academic literature. 
A. The Individual Badness Model 
The criminal law is replete with evaluative judgments based on 
apologies and expressions of remorse. Newspapers routinely report stories 
of victims who demand apologies, criminal defense attorneys who note 
their clients’ deep remorse, and judges who cite defendants’ lack of remorse 
when imposing harsh sentences.17 
 
16. Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of Popular 
Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 168 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also Scott E. 
Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the 
Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1557 (1998) (“Few ideas reverberate at the core of the 
human psyche as strongly as that of atonement.”). 
17. Recent high-profile examples include Sister Helen Prejean’s account of Patrick Sonnier’s 
execution in the popular book Dead Man Walking, and the August 2003 parole of former 1960s 
radical and member of the Weathermen Kathy Boudin. See HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN 
WALKING 244 (1993) (writing that a victim’s father attended the execution of his son’s murderer 
because he wanted to hear an apology, not to savor revenge); Charles Lane & Christine 
Haughney, Former Militant Is Granted Parole; Upcoming Release Angers Victim’s Family, 
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In many of these cases, the presence or absence of remorse, contrition, 
or apology can greatly help or hurt defendants. In federal court, for 
example, judges reduce sentences by two or three levels for defendants who 
express contrition or remorse.18 At the high end of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, this reduction can subtract years from a defendant’s sentence.19 
The effect is just as stark at the state level.20 In capital sentencing, 
according to one study, a defendant’s perceived remorse can significantly 
reduce the likelihood that a jury will impose the death penalty, especially 
for less vicious murders.21  
 
Others, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A2 (“At Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, Boudin 
expressed remorse . . . .”).  
18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (2003); see United States v. 
Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Several circuits have specifically held that a moral 
element is implicit in acceptance of responsibility and is satisfied by the defendant’s expression of 
contrition and remorse.”) (citing cases); United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 
1994) (observing that “a fundamental principle underlying the acceptance of responsibility 
reduction” is “that in the absence of evidence of sincere remorse or contrition for one’s crimes, a 
guilty plea entered for the apparent purpose of obtaining a lighter sentence does not entitle a 
defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility”); O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1526, 1524-
26 & nn.72-77 (noting that almost all appellate courts treat section 3E1.1 as “fundamentally about 
remorse or contrition,” but that in many but not all federal districts, judges automatically award 
acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to all defendants who plead guilty). While recent 
amendments to sentencing law now require a prosecutorial motion for the third level of reduction, 
see Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g), 117 Stat. 650, 671, there is little reason to 
think that these amendments will strengthen the tenuous tie between “acceptance of 
responsibility” and true remorse or contrition. 
19. Take, for example, a Category I offender whose offense level drops from thirty-seven to 
thirty-four after he receives a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section 
3E1.1. The offender’s sentencing range drops from 210 to 262 months down to 151 to 188 
months, a reduction of five to six years. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1; id. 
ch. 5, pt. A. As a general matter, a two- or three-level reduction in a defendant’s offense level 
usually reduces his sentencing range by about thirty-five percent. See id.; Julie R. O’Sullivan, In 
Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1342, 1415 & n.274 (1997) (collecting sources). 
20. See, e.g., State v. Hinson, 855 So. 2d 119, 121-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); State v. 
Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 891-93 (Me. 1984); Saenz v. State, 620 A.2d 401, 403-07 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1993). 
21. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital 
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1631-36 & tbls.9-10 (1998) (measuring capital jurors’ 
beliefs and their correlation with sentencing outcomes in a multivariate empirical study); see also 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In a 
capital sentencing proceeding, assessments of character and remorse may carry great weight and, 
perhaps, be determinative of whether the offender lives or dies.”); Eisenberg et al., supra, at 1632-
33 (finding that the “the difference . . . between jurors’ beliefs about the defendant’s remorse in 
life cases and in death cases is highly significant” and concluding that, “[i]n short, if jurors 
believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had done, they tended to sentence him to life 
imprisonment, not death”); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: 
What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559-61 (1998) (reaching same conclusion); 
Sundby, supra note 16, at 1560-66. As Eisenberg and his coauthors note, the presence or absence 
of remorse does not always exert a significant influence on capital sentencing juries. See 
Eisenberg et al., supra, at 1600. “[I]n highly vicious cases,” they found, “a defendant’s remorse 
may not be able to save him. But in lower viciousness cases . . . , remorse may make all the 
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Seemingly remorseless acts by children or adolescents can affect 
whether they are tried as juveniles or as adults.22 Parole boards take remorse 
into account in making release decisions.23 Contrition and apologies 
influence prosecutors’ decisions, including decisions not to charge, to 
accept proposed pleas, to enter into cooperation agreements, and to 
recommend favorable sentences.24 
Why does the criminal law accord so much weight to these 
expressions? In the eyes of judges, they indicate that an offender is not 
“lost,” that he has some self-transformative capacity that justifies (or 
requires) a lesser punishment. To be sure, the language of judicial opinions 
does not always express this sentiment directly. Some judges say that the 
remorseful offender has a better character than does the unremorseful one.25 
Others say that he is more likely to be rehabilitated,26 or that he is less 
 
difference.” Id. at 1636. For a good summary of how remorse can fit into a state’s statutory 
scheme in capital cases, see id. at 1604-07. 
22. See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the 
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2002) (“In many jurisdictions, the 
presence of contrition is a legitimate argument for retaining juvenile jurisdiction, whereas its 
absence militates in favor of ‘binding the child over’ to the criminal system.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment 
Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 310-11 (1999) (citing relevant cases and 
summarizing the ways that remorse or its absence can bear on the criteria for transfer). 
23. See, e.g., In re Smith, No. B157419, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 824, at *33-35 (Ct. App. 
June 5, 2003); Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 505-06 (N.Y. 2000).  
24. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 
56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43-44, 49-50 (2003) (observing that remorseful, apologetic, and generally 
repentant cooperators are more valuable to prosecutors than are unrepentant cooperators); Deena 
Winter, Short Sentence Angers Some, BISMARCK (N.D.) TRIB., Apr. 1, 2000, at A1 (reporting 
prosecutor’s recommendation of a favorable sentence for defendant who “showed remorse, 
accepted responsibility” and offered a “lengthy apology” at sentencing). For some lower-level 
nonviolent crimes involving first-time offenders, the prosecutor may enter into a diversion 
agreement with the offender whereby criminal charges are continued and eventually dropped after 
the offender fulfills the requirements in the diversion agreement. Often, one important 
requirement of such agreements is that the offender apologize to his victim and members of his 
community for his wrongdoing. See, e.g., Joint Motion To Continue—Diversion Agreement ¶ 9, 
New Hampshire v. Doe (Sept. 27, 2001) (docket number and court name redacted) (on file with 
authors) (requiring the defendant to “submit to the Court . . . and to the Office of the County 
Attorney an essay . . . which will set out an apology to the defendant’s parents, an apology to [the 
defendant’s school], and an apology to the County Attorney as a representative of the . . . Police 
Department and the New Hampshire community”).  
25. See, e.g., Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 90 & n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that trial 
judge erred in failing to consider defendant’s “tru[e] remorse” and other evidence of “his general 
good character,” coupled with his decision to plead guilty, as a mitigating circumstance at 
sentencing). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[The 
defendant] has repented by recognizing her guilt. She is remorseful over what she has done. She 
has also sought to apologize for her crime both to society at large and to [the victim] in particular  
. . . . This reflection and introspection is an aspect of her rehabilitation.”). 
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hardened,27 or simply that he deserves less punishment.28 Whatever the 
precise language, the judges’ point is that the remorseful offender is in 
some way changed, or likely to change. Judge Posner expressed this idea in 
United States v. Beserra: “A person who is conscious of having done 
wrong, and who feels genuine remorse for his wrong, . . . is on the way to 
developing those internal checks that would keep many people from 
committing crimes even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were 
lower than they are.”29 
This notion, which we call the individual badness model, dominates the 
criminal law’s current stance toward expressions of apology and remorse. 
This model, coupled with criminal law’s divorce of substance from 
procedure and its neglect of relational concepts, has obscured how remorse 
and apology can do much more to heal, reconcile, and reintegrate. The 
individual badness model has overshadowed this side of remorse  
and apology.  
B. Remorse and Apology in Criminal Procedure 
While remorse and apology are central to judgments about offenders 
and are important to victims and the public, day-to-day criminal justice 
makes very little room for them. Society deals with street crime through 
command-and-control strategies that consist largely of assembly-line 
justice. Mandatory minimum sentences and harsh recidivist laws govern 
punishment for many street crimes.30 The focus is on achieving as just an 
outcome as possible for each offender with maximum efficiency; 
procedures speed cases through to a mathematically correct disposition.31 
 
27. See, e.g., 3 Get Youth Detention in Rape of Retarded Teen, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 1993, § 1, 
at 10 (quoting sentencing judge’s observation, upon defendants’ apologies, that “they are not 
hardened criminals” and “not without redeeming value”). 
28. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 1986 WL 13263, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 1986) 
(docket number missing) (reducing defendant’s sentence from two ten-year terms to two three-
year terms to ensure that it was “no greater than that deserved for the offense” in light of, among 
other things, “the fact that the defendant expressed remorse over the incident” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
29. 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
30. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 656 (1998) (surveying recidivist 
statutes); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS § 5 (1998) (reporting sentencing data for federal and state courts); Darryl K. 
Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1295, 1314-15 (2001) (noting that “[t]he number of people in jails and prisons exceeded two 
million for the first time in 1999, average sentence lengths have increased, and offenders are more 
likely to have parole revoked for minor violations” and observing generally that today’s “punitive 
prosecutorial policies . . . demonstrate a commitment to harsh criminal approaches”). 
31. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 153, 159, 163-64 (1968); 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 31 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing general purpose of Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure); Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim 
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Efficiency is valuable, but it comes at a price.32 This emphasis on efficiency 
exemplifies a larger trend. Criminal procedure has come to focus on serving 
procedural values such as fairness, efficiency, and accuracy to the exclusion 
of incorporating substantive goals into the structure of procedural 
mechanisms.33 In the words of William Stuntz, criminal procedure today 
“is, basically, a subset of constitutional law,” leading to an artificial 
separation between criminal procedure and the substantive values at which 
the law aims.34 
This divorce of substantive values from procedure is apparent in 
criminal procedure’s treatment of remorse and apology. In theory, criminal 
law purports to concern itself with discerning and encouraging expressions 
of remorse and apology.35 But “in practice, far more attention is devoted to 
the prevention and punishment of crime than to ways in which criminals 
might be encouraged to repent and resume normal lives.”36 As a 
consequence, for all of their resonance with criminal law’s substantive 
values, remorse and apology have little room to flourish in criminal 
procedure. In some instances, direct procedural barriers obstruct apology 
and remorse; in other cases, procedure fails to ameliorate practical and 
contextual barriers. When remorse and apology do appear, they do so in 
spite of the criminal process, not because of it. 
Consider a typical offender—a vandal, maybe, or a low-level drug 
dealer, or a thief—in a typical small criminal case. From the time of arrest 
to sentencing, criminal procedure pays little heed to his expressions of 
 
Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 292-93 (emphasizing that current models of the 
criminal process focus on “the efficient suppression of crime,” where “[e]fficiency is the capacity 
to process criminal offenders rapidly” in “a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input 
to quality control” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Federal and state sentencing guidelines 
exemplify this mathematical trend. See Simons, supra note 24, at 9-10. 
32. Conversely, a system that allowed more room for remorse and apology would probably 
be less speedy and efficient. Each value requires tradeoffs of time and money. For example, the 
system works much faster when the repeat players do not have to worry about victims’ and 
defendants’ desires and interests. But because victims, defendants, and communities have 
personal stakes in the outcomes, unlike the repeat players, their interests and desires should carry 
weight as well. 
33. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1362-64, 1401. 
34. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (decrying the artificial separation between criminal procedure 
and substantive criminal law). 
35. See supra Section I.A. This point is evident in the philosophical theories of punishment 
that undergird the criminal law. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 254-62 (1986) 
(explaining that the punisher tries to induce contrition and repentance so that the offender will 
repudiate his past wrongful act and avoid committing it again); Jean Hampton, The Moral 
Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 
112, 115-17, 120-21 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that punishment teaches the 
offender that the crime is forbidden because it is morally and legally wrong). 
36. Robert Wuthnow, Repentance in Criminal Procedure: The Ritual Affirmation of 
Community, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 171, 172 (Amitai Etzioni & David 
E. Carney eds., 1997); see also id. at 179.   
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contrition. Beginning with arrest, he enters an adversarial system in which 
two lawyers, not the defendant and the victim, are the main actors. Often 
operating under staggering caseloads, the lawyers are concerned with 
negotiating just and speedy dispositions.37 In most cases, this means cutting 
deals on charges, pleas, and sentences.38 In the few cases headed toward 
trial, it means investigating, planning pretrial and trial strategy, and dealing 
with motions, trial dates, and the like. In either situation, much negotiation 
is informal and takes place between the two repeat players, out of the 
defendant’s presence.39 These two players strive to balance adversarial 
processes, efficient and accurate outcomes, and individual rights. They do 
not emphasize mining the possible value of remorse, apology, or 
repentance.40 
Throughout this process, the defendant has little chance to interact with 
anyone other than his own attorney. At their first meeting, the defendant’s 
attorney tells him to say nothing to anyone except the attorney himself. 
Their few later conversations overwhelmingly concern facts and legal 
niceties. Until it is time for the presentence report, any expressions of 
contrition or remorse make it only as far as the defense attorney or, on rare 
occasions, the prosecutor. Defense attorneys and prosecutors usually view 
these expressions as relevant only to the defendant’s willingness to fight, 
plead, or perhaps cooperate.41 The genuinely remorseful offender who 
wishes to apologize to his victim and make amends usually has no readily 
available way to do so. Indeed, from the time of arrest until trial (if there is 
one) and sentencing, victims are almost never in sight of the offender.42 
 
37. See, e.g., David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and 
Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 875, 874-75 (1992) (noting that 
prosecutors must serve conflicting goals, one of which is the “swift disposition of cases”); 
Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6, 
8-9 (discussing overwhelming caseloads of many criminal defense attorneys and resultant 
pressures to dispose of cases quickly and “on the cheap”). 
38. Guilty pleas resolve 94% to 95% of criminal cases, and most of these probably result 
from plea bargains. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2466 n.9 (2004) (collecting statistics).   
39. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.9(f) (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 
2004) (reviewing different types of informal interactions that take place between defense counsel 
and prosecutors); see also, e.g., United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing importance of “informal attorney statements” for “plea negotiation [and] . . . frank 
discussion between defense counsel and prosecutor on various topics that must be freely discussed 
in the interest of expediting trial preparation and the conduct of the trial”). 
40. To use Markus Dirk Dubber’s words, “In the war on crime, offenders and victims alike 
are irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand in the great machine of state risk management.” Markus 
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001). 
41. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1356-57 (2003); 
Simons, supra note 24, at 50 n.223. 
42. See Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 23 (noting that “discussion of apology is redundant” 
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Procedurally, apology and remorse factor in most significantly at 
sentencing. Even here, however, these expressions are largely pro forma. In 
many cases, the context of the sentencing allocution inhibits rather than 
facilitates meaningful remorse and apology. By the time of sentencing, 
criminal procedures have done little to encourage repentance, apology to 
victims, or coming to terms with one’s guilt. Some defendants in effect 
plead guilty without admitting guilt by entering pleas of nolo contendere or 
Alford pleas.43 Others contest their charges but are found guilty after trial. 
For both types of defendants, cognitive dissonance and continued denials 
make it particularly hard to express remorse and apologize.44 
Defendants who have fully admitted their guilt and pleaded guilty also 
face significant psychological and contextual barriers. Courtrooms are 
quasi-public settings, where defendants’ families and close friends are often 
present. This setting can humiliate offenders, especially those who prize 
their reputations most highly (such as white-collar offenders) or who have 
committed highly stigmatized crimes (such as sex offenders).45 Sentencing 
allocutions, moreover, are tightly scheduled, hurried, vague, and often in 
front of a judge who did not preside over the guilty plea.46 For most 
defendants, this is their first real chance to apologize for their crime to 
victims or the community. It is no wonder that, when apologies do occur at 
sentencing, they often are stilted, forced, or “not enough.”47 Many 
defendants simply read from a piece of paper.48 
 
in light of “the dominant adversarial paradigm of the court system,” which provides “no 
opportunity . . . for a direct exchange between [victims] and their offenders”); see also, e.g., 
PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 39 (2001) (noting that, despite 
expanding victim-notification rights, victims frequently are still unaware of the status of their 
cases). The single exception to this state of affairs is the small but growing number of cases for 
which victim-offender mediation is available. See infra notes 139-154 and accompanying text. 
43. A nolo contendere plea admits guilt for purposes of the present case but creates no 
estoppel, while an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while simultaneously asserting 
his innocence. Federal courts and most state courts permit both kinds of pleas. See Bibas, supra 
note 10, at 1370-72 & nn.44, 52 (collecting federal and state citations).  
44. See KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITZ, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221 (2d ed. 
2002) (explaining that, according to cognitive-dissonance theory, persons who take positions 
publicly are more likely to harden their attitudes to keep them in line with those positions even 
when real-world events call those positions into question); Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-400. 
45. For sources discussing the reputational sensitivity of white-collar defendants and its 
denial-related consequences, see, for example, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT—AN ASSESSMENT 11 
(1967); and Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for 
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999). For sources 
discussing sex crimes, see Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-97 nn.156-82. 
46. See generally United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that, 
with the parties’ consent, federal district courts may delegate guilty-plea allocutions to 
magistrates); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 26.4(g), at 1231 (describing the defendant’s 
opportunity to address the sentencing authority at allocution).  
47. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 29 (“[A] sincere expression of remorse is . . . 
something victims almost never have the chance to hear in the courtroom.”); see also, e.g., United 
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Nonetheless, judges heed expressions of remorse and apology and 
weigh them heavily at sentencing. As Judge Leventhal put it, “There is a 
natural, and I believe sound, disposition to adjust sanctions when an 
offender admits his responsibility. . . . I dare say that many judges, possibly 
the over-whelming majority, respond in this way . . . .”49 But even at 
sentencing, where criminal law actually carves out a procedural space for 
remorse and apology, the law focuses almost entirely on the offender. As 
with presentencing, context, practice, and procedure reflect this fact. We 
mentioned that allocution is often the first opportunity a defendant has to 
apologize to victims of his crime. All too often, however, this opportunity is 
more theoretical than real. Despite recent and dramatic increases in victims’ 
rights, victims play minimal roles at sentencing.50 Allocution occurs 
between the defendant and the sentencer.51 In many instances, victims are 
absent from the courtroom;52 when they are present, defendants do not face 
them. Even for defendants who are genuinely remorseful and wish to 
apologize to their victims, the colloquy is between the defendant and the 
judge. Victims usually sit with the public behind the defendant while the 
judge evaluates the defendant’s words and demeanor.53 At most, they read 
 
States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s denial of 
sentence reduction on the ground that defendant’s “one-sentence apology” was insufficient 
evidence of genuine remorse or contrition); Gregory D. Kesich, Suspect Sentenced for Murder of 
Friend, PORTLAND (Me.) PRESS HERALD, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1B (noting that victim disregarded 
defendant’s apology as insufficient); Monte Morin, Man Gets 8 Years in Charity Scheme, L.A. 
TIMES, July 25, 2002, at B2 (describing how prosecutors rejected defendant’s open-court apology 
as insincere). 
48. See, e.g., John P. Martin, Barber Told To Repay $57,000—Treffinger Friend Apologizes 
to Judge for Clipping the County, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 23, 2003, at 13 (describing 
defendant’s reading apology from a single piece of paper at his sentencing for embezzlement). 
49. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see STANTON WHEELER ET 
AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 115 (1988) 
(interviewing judges in pre-Guidelines study of sentencing of white-collar offenders and finding 
that “it is important for many judges that defendants recognize the gravity of their offense, accept 
the blame for their misdeeds, and express remorse or contrition for them”); supra notes 19-29 and 
accompanying text. 
50. See, e.g., TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 81-86, 92-96 (outlining contours of victims’ 
rights to be heard at sentencing, in jurisdictions in which they exist, as involving only rights to 
speak and present information to the sentencing authority); see also Strang & Sherman, supra note 
42, at 22 (“In general, victimology literature makes little mention of victims’ desire for apologies 
from their offenders.”). 
51. As one leading treatise puts it, allocution is an opportunity for the defendant “to get 
across his side of the story to the sentencer” by “personally address[ing] the sentencer.” 5 
LAFAVE ET AL. supra note 39, § 26.4(g), at 774 (emphasis added). 
52. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 96-98 (reviewing various studies suggesting that, as 
a general matter, a significant majority of felony victims are not present at sentencing). 
53. Indeed, to apologize to his victim directly, a defendant in most cases would have to turn 
his back on the sentencing judge. Darrell L. Brooks did just that at his high-profile sentencing for 
the arson of a Baltimore rowhouse resulting in the death of two parents and their five children. See 
Gail Gibson & Laurie Willis, Tears and Remorse Precede Life Term in Dawson Deaths; Arsonist, 
Victims’ Family Tell Judge of Their Pain, BALT. SUN, Aug. 28, 2003, at 1A (describing how 
Brooks “apologized to [Judge] Garbis for turning his back on the judge but said his comments 
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brief victim-impact statements or, more commonly, submit written 
statements before sentencing, which judges rarely read aloud.54 There is no 
victim-offender dialogue and no opportunity for face-to-face apology or 
expressions of contrition. 
Defendants likewise have few opportunities to express sorrow and 
apologize to community representatives. The paradigmatic symbol of the 
community in the criminal law—a jury of the defendant’s peers—as a rule 
has no role at sentencing, except at capital trials. Trial judges dominate the 
sentencing process.55 Furthermore, the prevalence of guilty pleas means 
that, before sentencing, most defendants never see a jury. They thus bypass 
the traditional arbiter of community values, which in times past encouraged 
repentance and apology.56 In those few cases that go to trial or give jurors a 
role at sentencing, defendants can address the jury as “the conscience of the 
community.”57 But even here, jurors’ role is far from interactive—they 
cannot, for example, question the defendant, and the defendant rarely 
addresses them directly.58 Offenders determined to express remorse and to 
apologize may have to resort to the news media to circumvent criminal 
procedure’s barrier of silence. 
Context and procedure, in short, discourage the expressions about 
which the criminal law cares. This tension leaves criminal law in the uneasy 
position of judging offenders based on expressions it has done little to elicit 
or probe. It also denies victims, offenders, and their communities any real 
opportunity to reap the substantial social, psychological, and moral benefits 
that these expressions carry with them. Frustration, pain, guilt, and 
alienation replace the potential for closure, relief, healing, and 
 
were intended for the [victims’] relatives” and how he then, “[f]acing a packed courtroom, . . . 
went on to speak for minutes about his remorse”). In a few courtrooms, however, the victim might 
sit in visitors’ seats that face both the judge and the offender.   
54. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, at 96-98.  
55. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953 
(2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314 
(2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1790 (1999). Even though the Supreme Court has begun to 
endorse a role for jurors at sentencing, they are unlikely to dominate the process any time soon. 
See infra note 296. 
56. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968) (explaining that juries 
inject “contemporary community values” into punishment decisions); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1993) (explaining that colonial Americans 
prized the jury trial as “an occasion for repentance and reintegration”). 
57. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519. 
58. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS 228, 236 (1996); see also John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the 
Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170-71 (1996) 
(noting the jury’s “epochal transformation from active neighborhood investigators to passive 
triers”). 
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reconciliation. This, in turn, undercuts some of the core substantive goals of 
the criminal law. 
C. Remorse and Apology in the Literature 
Scholars have given scant attention to the roles of remorse and apology 
in the criminal justice system.59 Tracking the emphasis of the law, many 
commentators have focused on the pragmatic, administrative, and 
epistemological difficulties of using them as proxies for individual 
badness.60 For example, Michael O’Hear criticizes remorse-based sentence 
discounts as unworkable and unfair ways of using remorse and apology to 
determine how much punishment offenders deserve.61 Likewise, Martha 
Grace Duncan and Margareth Etienne both note that remorse-based 
sentencing in practice often correlates poorly with the offender’s actual 
remorse or blameworthiness.62 Some scholars—including Jean Hampton, 
Jeffrie Murphy, Austin Sarat, and Robert Wuthnow—eschew pragmatic and 
administrative concerns. Instead, they look more deeply and theoretically at 
how remorse relates to punishment, particularly how remorse and apology 
fit within prevailing theories of punishment.63 Stephen Garvey goes further 
 
59. See supra note 7. 
60. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 21 
(exploring why expressions of remorse influence jurors’ sentencing decisions and identifying 
several methodological challenges for the future systematic analysis of the relationship between 
remorse and sentencing outcome); Sundby, supra note 16, at 1597, 1588-98 (contending that, 
because capital jurors give great weight to remorse, capital defense counsel “would be greatly 
remiss to pursue a run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the prosecution’s case for failing to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before weighing carefully the potential impact such a 
strategy will have on the penalty phase”). 
61. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1542-60 (listing dangers including excessive litigation, 
disparity, discrimination, failing to encourage rehabilitation, dishonesty in sentencing, difficulty in 
discerning remorse, and chilling the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights). O’Hear argues that 
appellate courts should abandon the fiction that U.S. Sentencing Guideline section 3E1.1 is 
pegged to remorse. Instead, he advocates the approach that trial courts more or less already take, 
which ties sentencing discounts to guilty pleas because these are efficient and spare the system 
trials. See id. at 1560-61. Our argument is exactly the opposite—courts and commentators are too 
focused on narrow notions of efficiency and not focused enough on the power and benefits of 
remorse. 
62. See Duncan, supra note 22, at 1472-73 (noting that judges and jurors often mistakenly 
view juvenile offenders as remorseless, and contending that these offenders’ denials and lack of 
remorse are often understandable); Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating 
Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103 (2003) 
[hereinafter Etienne, Remorse] (arguing that federal judges penalize defendants under section 
3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by equating zealous advocacy with remorselessness); 
Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An 
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425 (2004) (same, using a qualitative empirical study to confirm this 
claim).  
63. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677-78 (1992); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, 
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and tries to build a new theoretical framework for punishment around those 
concepts.64 Not all of these scholars embrace the individual badness 
model.65 But even those who do not, such as Garvey, rarely connect their 
views to actual on-the-ground institutions, practices, and procedures. The 
one partial departure is R.A. Duff, who discusses in general terms how 
criminal mediation could promote apology, reparations, reconciliation, 
moral education, and reform.66 
Commentators who go further fall into two main camps. The first is the 
“apology as sanction” camp. Scholars in this camp either argue for (Amitai 
Etzioni, Dan Kahan, Eric Posner, and David Skeel)67 or against (Sharon 
 
Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE, supra note 36, at 143, 148-51 (discussing relationship 
of repentance to deterrence and retributivism); Sarat, supra note 16, at 168-72 (discussing general 
relationship of remorse to punishment); Wuthnow, supra note 36, at 174-79 (discussing historical 
role of repentance in society’s treatment of criminals and its relationship to modern theories of 
punishment); see also HERBERT MORRIS, Guilt and Suffering, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 89, 
104-08 (1976) (arguing that punishment by itself never can be restorative of personal 
relationships, but that accompanying feelings of guilt, contrition, and repentance can provide the 
grounds for genuine restoration); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death 
Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic 
Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1140-44 (2001) (reviewing relationship of 
remorse to various theories of punishment). 
64. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1802 (using concepts of 
repentance, apology, reparation, and penance to articulate a theoretical model of punishment 
“aimed at the expiation of the wrongdoer’s guilt and his reconciliation with the victim and the 
community”). 
65. Murphy, for instance, recognizes that “[r]epentance may be conceptualized as either an 
interior mental act or as an act with an essential social dimension.” JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING 
EVEN 41 (2003). 
66. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 93-99 (2001). Duff goes 
on to talk in general terms about how types of punishment, proportionality, sentencers, and similar 
procedures affect the messages sent by punishments. Other exceptions include a few pages in the 
following: Bibas, supra note 10, at 1368-70; Carrie J. Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice 
Setting: Evidence for Including Apology as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 337, 346-47 (2002); Simons, supra note 24, at 34; and Wuthnow, supra note 
36, at 179-84. 
Foreign scholars have gone further in addressing how criminal mediation might work to 
bring about apology, healing, reconciliation, and reform. This is a significant theme in the German 
literature, for example, where mediation often is called the “third way” after punishment and civil 
commitment. See Detlev Frehsee, Restitution and Offender-Victim Arrangement in German 
Criminal Law: Development and Theoretical Implications, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 235 (1999) 
(reviewing history and current state of victim-offender mediation in Germany); see also William 
T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on 
American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37 (1996) (comparing American and German victims’ 
relative rights to participate in criminal proceedings). 
67. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 634, 637-52 (describing the use of apology as a “contrition 
penalty” and arguing that such penalties, along with other shaming sanctions, are effective and 
appropriate in certain circumstances); Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 365 (making a similar 
argument in the context of white-collar crime); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) (advocating use of apology as a shaming penalty for corporate 
crime); Amitai Etzioni, Back to the Pillory?, AM. SCHOLAR, Summer 1999, at 43, 44. Additional 
proponents of expanding the use of apology as a sanctioning mechanism include Katharine Baker 
and Jayne Barnard. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 699-701 
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Lamb and Toni Massaro)68 using apology to punish. Debate within this 
camp is a subset of the larger debate over the wisdom of shaming sanctions. 
The concern is not with how criminal procedure can promote healing, 
repentance, and reconciliation, but rather with whether court-ordered 
apology can deter crime. 
The second camp is the “restorative justice” camp. As its undisputed 
leader, John Braithwaite,69 defines the term, restorative justice “is a process 
whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to 
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its 
implications for the future.”70 Restorativists consider apology and remorse 
important as part of a holistic process. They hope that offenders will 
recognize the wrongfulness of their conduct, make amends with their 
victims and the community, and try to restore the moral balance by making 
actual or symbolic reparations.71 Restorative justice, however, does not seek 
to reform criminal procedure to broaden and deepen the values served by 
criminal punishment. Instead, the restorative processes of remorse, apology, 
and reparation are supposed to be complete alternatives to punishment.72 
 
(1999); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
959, 1001 (1999).  
68. See Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their 
Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929, 953, 951-56 (2003) 
(discussing the relationship of apology and remorse to shaming punishments and arguing that 
“criminals and other wrongdoers will derive little benefit from wholesale rejection and the ending 
of a relationship through shaming acts”); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American 
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991) (reviewing the use of apologies as shaming 
sanctions and arguing generally that dominant social and cultural traditions in the United States 
render shaming sanctions ill advised). Norval Morris and Michael Tonry also take this view. See 
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE 
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 5 (1990). 
69. Braithwaite is “the world’s preeminent scholar of restorative justice.” Erik Luna, 
Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10. 
70. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, in 
25 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 5 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting definition of restorative justice formulated by Tony Marshall); 
see also Luna, supra note 69, at 3 (adopting Braithwaite’s definition). 
71. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 293-94 (explaining the role of remorse and apology 
in restorative processes). 
72. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 303, 303 (noting that proponents of restorative justice “insist on the total 
elimination of punishment” and critiquing this position); Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of 
Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 377 (“[T]he 
literature by the leaders of the restorative justice movement make[s] clear that they conceive of 
restorative processes not simply as a potentially useful piece of, or complement to, the criminal 
justice system, but as a substitute for it.” (citing John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is 
Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1746 (1999))). But cf. John 
Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 404 [hereinafter 
Braithwaite, Holism] (suggesting that punishment might be necessary as a fallback “when 
criminals eschew atonement, . . . to affirm [the] moral order and to vindicate victims”); Howard 
Zehr, Book Review, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654 (2003) (reviewing THE SPIRITUAL 
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II.  THE BROADER VALUE OF REMORSE AND APOLOGY 
What accounts for this troubling dissonance between criminal law and 
procedure? Earlier, we explained that criminal procedure ignores remorse 
and apology because it emphasizes procedural values such as autonomy, 
efficiency, and fairness to the exclusion of substantive concerns. In this Part 
we argue that the criminal law’s misguided focus on the individual badness 
model only exacerbates this problem. The individual badness model treats 
remorse and apology as yardsticks for an offender’s need for deterrence and 
retribution. That model, however, suffers from serious pragmatic, 
administrative, and conceptual problems on both an internal and an external 
level. Internally, an offender’s need for retribution and deterrence often 
correlates poorly with remorse and apology. Externally, the individual 
badness model overlooks remorse and apology’s relational dimension. 
Remorse and apology are not simply tools for diagnosing the appropriate 
punishments for individual defendants. They can heal, teach, and reconcile 
offenders, victims, and communities. 
This last point relates to a second, broader trend in the criminal law that 
has affected its view of remorse and apology. The criminal law views crime 
and punishment as overwhelmingly about the individual offender and 
applies deterrence and retribution accordingly. In contrast, a rich and 
growing body of sociological and psychological work views remorse and 
apology as social mechanisms that restore relationships and affirm group 
membership. Other areas of the law, such as civil mediation and 
reparations, are less constrained by deterrence, retribution, and 
individualism and have begun to mine these insights. Criminal law can 
learn from these areas how to integrate the values served by remorse and 
apology into the day-to-day criminal justice system. Doing so, moreover, 
does not require abandoning deterrence, retribution, or bedrock procedural 
values.  
A. The Status Quo Revisited 
Assume for the moment that the individual badness model properly 
seeks to discern each offender’s badness and need for punishment. As 
metrics for punishment, expressions of remorse and apology do not work 
 
ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Michael L. Hadley ed., 2001)) (“[R]estorative justice 
advocates have done a disservice by positioning restoration and retribution as mutually exclusive 
adversaries. As a restorative justice advocate who initially popularized this dichotomy, I have 
personally taken this argument to heart and changed my approach accordingly.” (citation 
omitted)). This last review is an isolated, brief, and recent change of heart, not apparently shared 
by Braithwaite, the leading figure in the field. For the most part, restorative justice academics see 
themselves as at odds with criminal punishment. See infra Section II.C. 
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very well. Indeed, much of the commentary on remorse and apology in 
criminal justice focuses on this fact. We already have outlined some of 
these concerns, such as cognitive dissonance and contextual obstacles to 
apologizing and expressing remorse in the courtroom.73 One can also doubt 
judges’ and jurors’ ability to gauge the sincerity and depth of expressions of 
remorse and apology.74 Thus, the justice system may reward well-executed 
fakery and the “acquired skill” of expressing “appropriate” attitudes in the 
courtroom.75 In addition, overemphasis on remorse and apology may punish 
defendants not for their inherent badness but instead for their attorneys’ 
zealous advocacy or for their own exercise of their Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.76 And sentencers’ perceptions of remorse may 
“implicate much deep-seated racial, cultural, class, and gender baggage.”77 
Our criticism of how the criminal law accounts for remorse and 
apology goes deeper, so we will not dwell on these problems here. We flag 
them simply to illustrate how thoroughly the individual badness model has 
colored the criminal law’s evaluation of remorse and apology. If the 
internal critiques of the individual badness model are correct, then the law’s 
stance disserves important substantive values such as fairness and equal 
treatment, and criminal procedure does nothing to correct it. 
A more interesting, and for our purposes more significant, question is 
whether traditional deterrence theorists or retributivists should be so 
concerned with adjusting an offender’s sentence based on his expression of 
remorse or apology. Take deterrence first. A basic conception of deterrence 
asserts that punishment is justified because it averts future harm by 
imposing costs on undesirable conduct. The classic approach to deterrence 
 
73. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. 
74. See United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (“The effort to appraise 
‘character’ is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessarily an enterprise for which judges are 
notably equipped by prior training.”); United States v. Torres, No. 84 CR 583, 1987 WL 15173, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1987) (“[T]here is no way to know whether a defendant is truly remorseful 
for having committed the offense or whether his remorse is rather for his having been caught . . . .”), 
aff’d, 809 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987); Amitai Etzioni, Introduction, in REPENTANCE, supra note 36, 
at 1, 9; O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1549-51. 
75. O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555. These difficulties, however, are not insurmountable. See 
infra Section III.G. 
76. See, e.g., Etienne, Remorse, supra note 62, at 2111 (arguing that federal judges penalize 
defendants under section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by equating zealous 
advocacy with remorselessness); O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1556-60 (arguing that the incorporation 
of remorse into section 3E1.1 threatens to chill the exercise of defendants’ First, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendment rights). 
77. O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555; see also United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (observing that “penetrating judicial examination of the criminal’s soul” in practice can 
amount to “lenience toward those who cry more easily, or who have sufficient criminal experience 
to display sentiment at sentencing”).  
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treats it strictly as a cost-benefit analysis.78 To the extent that the expected 
penalty for committing a crime outweighs the expected benefit, a potential 
wrongdoer will be deterred.79 Remorseful and apologetic wrongdoers, the 
basic thinking goes, need less deterrence than do unremorseful ones for at 
least two reasons. First, remorseful and apologetic wrongdoers, by virtue of 
the pangs of conscience associated with such expressions, “pay a higher 
price” than do unremorseful offenders for their wrongful conduct.80 Hence, 
it makes sense to lower their sanction accordingly. Second, remorseful and 
apologetic wrongdoers, simply by virtue of being remorseful and apologetic 
people, are “less likely to offend again” in the future.81 “As a result, the 
community needs to be less worried about the offender and can afford to be 
more lenient.”82 
This reasoning is dubious at best. As of yet, psychology, psychiatry, 
sociology, and criminology have not empirically linked expressions of 
remorse and apology to a decreased need for specific deterrence of 
particular offenders.83 Moreover, crediting the remorseful offender with 
costs incurred may well undercut general deterrence of other potential 
offenders, encouraging them to discount their expected penalty by the 
remorse-apology discount. They may assume that, if they do get caught, 
they can lower their penalty by acting remorseful and apologizing. The 
deterrent message of the expected sanction shifts from “If you do X, you 
will suffer Y” to “Don’t worry about suffering Y if you do X, as long as you 
can seem to feel bad about it.”84 Finally, the narrow sentencing discount 
from appearing sorry at sentencing obscures the more robust benefits to 
offenders and victims of remorse outside of sentencing. Offenders learn to 
embrace remorse and apology not as steps to healing and reintegration, but 
as ways to lighten their sentences if they are caught.85 
 
78. As we discuss in Section III.F, however, modern theorists reconceptualize deterrence as 
influencing the social norms and meanings of crimes, which leaves more room for remorse and 
apology. 
79. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 170 & n.1 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180 (1968); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition 
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 425 (1999) (reviewing basics of deterrence theory). 
80. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 24, at 31. 
81. Sarat, supra note 16, at 170; see also, e.g., In re Rubinstein, 506 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (App. 
Div. 1986); Murphy, supra note 63, at 148-49; supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.  
82. Sarat, supra note 16, at 170.  
83. See Petrucci, supra note 66, at 360, 359-60 (noting the need for additional empirical 
studies “to determine whether it is apology itself or some other closely related variable that is 
associated or causally linked with reduced recidivism”). 
84. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 360 (1996) (explaining how the criminal law’s response to 
emotions can alter the deterrent message sent to offenders). 
85. See, e.g., Wuthnow, supra note 36, at 179 (“[P]roponents of deterrence point out that 
repentance should not be considered in sentencing because the purpose of criminal prosecution is 
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Retributivism runs into similar problems. Classical (or grievance) 
retributivism holds that an offender should be punished “because, and only 
because, [he] deserves it.”86 It also posits that the appropriate amount of 
punishment is commensurate with the objective moral seriousness of the 
offense. In this sense, classical retributivism is backward-looking because it 
is properly concerned only with the offender’s wrongful act and the 
circumstances surrounding it.87 But if the conduct and circumstances that 
matter to garden-variety retributivism are so limited, retributivists should 
not care about post-offense remorse, apology, or repentance. In most cases, 
these expressions neither lessen the culpability of the act itself nor mitigate 
any physical or pecuniary harm suffered by the victim.88 As Murphy puts it, 
“In general, the wrongfulness of conduct at one time will not be affected by 
repentance at a later time.”89 
One could still justify lowering a remorseful offender’s sentence under 
another version of retributivism known as character retributivism. 
According to character retributivism, a wrongdoer’s deserts are a function 
not merely of his wrongful acts, but also of his character.90 But here too, 
real questions exist. On the one hand, the remorseful and apologetic 
wrongdoer seems to reveal a better character than does the hardened one. 
On the other hand, he also reveals a moral nature that he must have 
suppressed to commit the crime in question. Contrast him with the 
remorseless wrongdoer, who is simply a “crude and unreflective thug”91 
 
not so much to mete out punishment on the basis of the offender’s own character but as an 
example to other potential offenders.”). But see infra Section III.F (acknowledging merit in a 
more modern version of deterrence that focuses on the criminal law’s power to influence values 
and the formation of preferences). 
86. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, 
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 
1987); see also IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140-45 (Mary Gregor ed. & 
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 198 
(W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796-1797); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING 
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153 (2002).  
87. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 
1408 (2002) (“Retributivism limits attention to an offender’s mental state, conduct, and the harm 
he caused . . . .”); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1445 (2004) (noting that 
“[r]etribution is often characterized as being concerned with the offender’s past wrongdoing” and 
that retributivism generally holds that punishment “should be commensurate to the seriousness of 
the wrong and [the offender’s] blameworthiness in committing it”). 
88. See Murphy, supra note 63, at 149 (“I typically do not cease to have a grievance against 
you simply because you are now sorry that you wronged me; nor do your debts to me disappear 
merely because you now lament those acts that put you into debt to me.”). 
89. Id. Perhaps mercy justifies lighter sentences for repentant offenders, but mercy is in 
tension with retribution because it sidesteps desert and allows unequal treatment. See Markel, 
supra note 87, at 1425; Murphy, supra note 63, at 149. 
90. See Murphy, supra note 63, at 149; see also Robbins, supra note 63, at 1118 (arguing that 
character retributivism requires the commutation of the death sentences of genuinely remorseful 
and hence—according to Robbins—ethically transformed offenders). 
91. Murphy, supra note 63, at 150. 
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who never really thinks things through. Better yet, contrast him with a 
wrongdoer who suffers from psychosis or other mental illness for which 
lack of remorse is a known symptom.92 These remorseless wrongdoers may 
not be as bad as the offender with a fully formed moral personality who 
appreciates the wrongfulness of his crime and commits it anyway. Indeed, 
the insanity and diminished-capacity defenses exist precisely to give effect 
to this intuition: Wrongdoers who do not fully appreciate the wrongfulness 
of their crimes—and so are less likely to express remorse or apologize—are 
sometimes less blameworthy than those who do.93 
If one focuses on individual badness, in other words, it is hard to 
understand why remorse and apology should matter as much as they do. 
This problem, though, is not attributable solely to the individual badness 
model itself. The model is symptomatic of a deeper strain of thinking in 
contemporary criminal law scholarship: a focus on the individual offender, 
to the exclusion of victims, society, and their relations with the offender.94 
Criminal sentencing and punishment have long been preoccupied with 
individual offenders. Indeed, “by the 1970s and 1980s, there was a 
consensus within the academy that all of the most important theoretical 
questions in the criminal law were about individuals: individual ‘self-
control,’ individual dangerousness, and individual culpability.”95 One 
consequence is that crime is viewed largely as a matter between the 
 
92. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS § 301.7, at 650 (4th ed. 1994) (listing as one of the seven diagnostic criteria for 
Antisocial Personality Disorder “lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or 
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another”). 
93. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. (1980) (noting that “diminished 
responsibility . . . achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt” because 
“[m]oral condemnation must be founded, at least in part, on some perception of the capacities and 
limitations of the individual actor”); Herbert Morris, Sex, Shame, and Assorted Other Topics, 22 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 123, 131 (2003) (noting that individuals who suffer from a mental illness that 
diminishes culpability for their wrongful conduct are appropriately viewed as subjects for 
treatment instead of punishment); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of 
Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2000) (explaining that the 
purpose of the insanity defense is to help distinguish between those offenders who are 
blameworthy and culpable and those who are not). The same intuition underlies the criminal law’s 
general ranking of recklessness as a more blameworthy state of mind than simple negligence. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (1985). 
94. Compared to private law areas, American criminal law seems more focused on society. 
But compared with European criminal law, or with what American criminal law could be, our 
current criminal law is largely about the individual offender, his rights, his guilt, and his need for 
punishment. Victims and others play minor roles at best. 
95. Victoria F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 
1700 (2003); see also Katyal, supra note 41, at 1311-12 (“Most law professors . . . think about 
crime as a solo enterprise—a tendency reinforced by the individualist prism of microeconomics 
and the case-driven method of studying specific parties.”); Nourse, supra, at 1695 (“Since the 
1970s, there has been an often unstated consensus that the proper level of analysis of the criminal 
law is at the individualized level of mind or conduct (whether of individual defendants or the 
collective sum of all potential defendants).”). 
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offender and the state; victims and community have little role to play.96 
Another consequence is that the idea of individual dispositions toward or 
against criminality drives much of the thinking about how best to control 
and respond to crime.97 
These tendencies shape criminal law’s stance toward expressions of 
remorse and apology. If criminal law and punishment are about responding 
to an individual’s willingness to act on his criminal disposition, then 
remorse and apology do not deserve major roles in criminal procedure. 
Individual offenders, in the law’s view, will be disposed to repent and 
apologize, or they will not. Either way, the criminal law, guided by the twin 
aims of deterrence and retribution, will respond accordingly. Criminal 
procedure will have no reason to focus on encouraging expressions of 
remorse and apology from offenders to their victims and the community. 
Instead, it can concern itself with the more pressing task of safeguarding 
certain core procedural values: efficiency, fairness, and individual rights. 
This is exactly what we see in the status quo.98 
B. The Broader Value of Remorse and Apology 
1. Crime as a Relational Concept 
Crime and punishment are about more than simply controlling 
offenders as individuals. As any crime victim can tell you, crime also 
disrupts status relationships among offenders, victims, and communities. If 
you are mugged or your car is broken into, you are distressed not just 
because you lose the money in your wallet or must pay to replace your 
radio. You likely feel violated and belittled by the perpetrator and his act. 
Likewise, the crime distresses other members of the community not simply 
because they fear losing money or property. The crime also carries a 
symbolic message from the wrongdoer that the community’s norms do not 
apply to him and that he is superior to the victim and others like him. 
This account recognizes that crime and punishment are as much about 
social norms, social influence, and relations between persons as about 
 
96. See Dubber, supra note 40, at 851 (noting that the “person of the victim” has 
“disappear[ed] entirely and emphatically” from criminal law, which aims instead to protect 
society from “anti-social conduct one expects from anti-social individuals” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Nourse, supra note 95, at 1700 & n.37. 
97. See Brown, supra note 87, at 1406; David Garland, Ideas, Institutions and Situational 
Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 
1, 1-14 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000); see also Dubber, supra note 40, at 849 (explaining 
that the modern war on crime treats offenders and victims not as persons, but as threatening 
automata and inefficient nuisances, respectively). 
98. See supra Part I. 
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individual blame and state-imposed suffering. Dan Kahan has espoused a 
similar, expressive view of crime. As he puts it, “The distinctive meaning 
of criminal wrongdoing is its denial of some important value, such as the 
victim’s moral worth.”99 In Kahan’s view, theft differs from competition in 
part because “against the background of social norms theft expresses 
disrespect for the injured party’s worth, whereas competition (at least 
ordinarily) does not.”100 Along the same lines, Jean Hampton’s expressive 
theory of retribution focuses on the messages that wrongful behavior and 
sanctions send to victims, offenders, and the community.101 Wrongdoing, 
Hampton explains, sends a “false message” that the victim is worth less 
than the offender.102 The crime announces that the victim does not deserve 
respect and that the offender can instead use him as a means to an end.103  
Social psychologists, especially equity theorists, emphasize this 
relational aspect of wrongdoing. Equity theorists, in discussing both 
criminal and civil wrongdoing, emphasize that “a wrongdoer’s 
transgression against an injured party results in an inequity in their 
relationship; that is, the wrong creates a moral imbalance between the 
parties.”104 This moral imbalance extends beyond the specific victims to the 
moral and social community whose norms the wrongdoer has flouted. 
Through his transgression, the wrongdoer sets himself off from that 
community and sends a symbolic message to it and the victim: He is not 
part of the group and does not have to play by its rules.105 According to 
equity theory, punishment seeks to “set the balance right” by mending the 
breach caused by the wrongdoer and reaffirming social and community 
norms.106 An emerging body of empirical evidence supports this theoretical 
 
99. Kahan, supra note 9, at 597. 
100. Id. at 597-98; see id. at 598 (“In effect, the thief’s behavior says to the victim, ‘you 
matter so little, relative to me, that I can take your property without your consent.’”). 
101. See Hampton, supra note 63, at 1677. 
102. Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 1, 8, 12 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992). 
103. See id. at 8; see also Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in JEFFRIE G. 
MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 35, 44 (1988) (“When someone wrongs 
another, she does not regard her victim as the sort of person who is valuable enough to require 
better treatment.”). Jeffrie Murphy shares this view. See Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and 
Resentment, in MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra, at 14, 25. 
104. Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: 
Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2003); see also Elaine 
Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 153 
(1973). 
105. See, e.g., Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to 
Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 286 (1997) 
(explaining the ways in which transgressions “throw[] into doubt the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that are constitutive of [social] order”); Hampton, supra note 63, at 1677-82. 
106. See, e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 105, at 286 (explaining that punishment is 
necessary “to restore the moral status quo ante and to reduce whatever cognitive and emotional 
unease was produced in individual[s] . . . by the . . . transgression”); Robbennolt et al., supra note 
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account. The evidence suggests that jurors, litigants, victims, and even 
offenders in both criminal and civil cases consider this relational aspect of 
wrongdoing extremely important.107 
Mainstream criminal law scholarship has been slow to incorporate these 
insights regarding the relational dimension of criminal wrongdoing into 
practical recommendations for criminal justice reforms. But there are a few 
exceptions. Kahan’s expressive theory, for example, drives his pro-shaming 
stance.108 He has used the same theory to argue for retaining corporate 
criminal liability and for alternatives to the traditional crackdowns on 
gangs.109 Darryl Brown and Neal Katyal have argued that criminal law’s 
traditional focus on individuals has obscured the key roles of social 
influence and group identity.110 This insight supports new rules and 
strategies to facilitate extracting information from conspirators.111 It also 
supports extending cooperative, nonpunitive crime-control policies from 
corporate crime to street crime.112 Kyron Huigens endorses Brown’s social 
approach to crime. He grounds this social approach, however, not in 
consequentialism but in a virtue-based analysis of how interdependent 
humans must get along in society.113 In a similar vein, Stephen Garvey has 
developed a theory of “punishment as atonement” that seeks to reconcile 
 
104, at 1143, 1139-44 (discussing how criminal and civil punishment restores moral balance by 
reaffirming the value of victims and social norms and “mending the breach caused by the 
defendant’s reprehensible actions”); see also HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON 
GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 63, at 31, 34 (arguing that crime involves seizing an unfair 
advantage over law-abiding citizens, so punishment is needed to “restore[] the equilibrium of 
benefits and burdens by taking from the [wrongdoer] what he owes”). 
107. See Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror 
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 326-27 
(1999); Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the 
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 25 (1993); Gordon Bazemore & Mark S. 
Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative 
Responses to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296 (1995); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of 
the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); infra Subsections II.B.2-3, Sections III.A-B (discussing reactions 
of victims and offenders to apologetic discourse in restorative justice programs). 
108. See Kahan, supra note 9. 
109. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 609, 619, 618-22 (1998) (arguing that corporate crime denigrates societal values and the 
worth of victims just as much as street crime, and that corporate criminal liability “repudiate[s] 
the[se] false valuations” and “‘sends the message’ that people matter”); id. at 612-15 (arguing that 
gang-control strategies that seek to undermine the positive meaning of gang membership are 
superior to traditional crackdown strategies, which simply reinforce the perceptions that motivate 
gang membership in the first place). 
110. See Brown, supra note 30; Brown, supra note 87; Katyal, supra note 41. 
111. See Katyal, supra note 41, at 1381-90. 
112. See Brown, supra note 30, at 1345-57. 
113. See Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A 
Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 8 (2002); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and 
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1460-62 (1995). 
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offenders with their victims and reintegrate them into the community.114 
Unfortunately, Garvey “say[s] little about specific institutions” and does not 
“develop any concrete proposals for institutional or doctrinal reform.”115 
While these scholars’ perspectives on criminal law vary significantly, 
each of their projects recognizes that relational perspectives merit scholarly 
concern.116 An approach to criminal law that focuses exclusively on 
individual dispositions toward and consequences of criminal behavior is 
necessarily incomplete. As David Garland explains, we also must heed the 
“cultural role” of legal rules and practices, or their ability to “create social 
meaning and thus shape social worlds.”117 This cultural, relational approach 
does not require abandoning deterrence, retribution, efficiency, or the 
adversarial process. But the overlooked relational approach could 
supplement these goals and generate better approaches to crime control. 
The next Subsection explains how the relational perspective changes our 
understanding of how remorse and apology can and should matter to the 
criminal law. 
2. Remorse and Apology as Relational Concepts 
Crime is about more than “microeconomic concerns with individual 
behavior.”118 So too, expressions of remorse and apology are about more 
than predicting future dangerousness or determining just deserts. To be 
sure, these expressions could offer some insight into an individual 
offender’s moral orientation—the focus of the individual badness model.119 
 
114. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1801, 1804; see also Simons, 
supra note 24, at 33-54 (applying Garvey’s model of punishment as atonement to reconceptualize 
the use of cooperators in criminal law). 
115. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1804. 
116. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 30, at 1352 (discussing importance of crime-control 
policies that “aim[] to reintegrate offenders into society rather than shame them in an 
unproductive, alienating fashion”); Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1809-10 
(analogizing criminal wrongdoing to sin because both essentially are about damage to important 
relationships—the sinner’s to his relationship with God and the wrongdoer’s to his relationship 
with the community and its members); Katyal, supra note 41, at 1356-58 (arguing that an 
effective “flipping” strategy for prosecutors requires an emphasis on repentance, salvation, and 
the ritualized return of a wrongdoer to the community of law-abiding citizens). Victoria Nourse 
has similarly stressed the importance of appreciating the relational aspects of crime. See Nourse, 
supra note 95, at 1692, 1701 (arguing that “[o]ne must look to ‘how people will respond’ to the 
law and what relations they will create in response” to understand fully the effect of a law and that 
an appreciation of “social norms, status relations, and culture more generally” is necessary for a 
complete understanding of the criminal law).  
117. David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice, 
in 11 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 191, 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Sibley eds., 
1991) (emphasis omitted). 
118. Katyal, supra note 41, at 1398. 
119. Cf. supra Section II.A (noting the practical and theoretical difficulties of using remorse 
and apology to gauge an offender’s individual badness and need for deterrence and retribution). 
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But they also function as essentially social mechanisms of healing, 
reconciliation, moral education, and reintegration. 
Apology, expressions of remorse, and other mea culpas are secular 
remedial rituals. They both teach and reconcile by reaffirming societal 
norms and vindicating victims.120 As such, they are concerned not just with 
individual dispositions but also with membership in a particular moral 
community. In Nicholas Tavuchis’s words, an apology “is [a] 
quintessentially social, that is, a relational symbolic gesture occurring in a 
complex interpersonal field.”121 To apologize and repent for one’s 
wrongdoing is to expiate, to make amends. It is also to commit visibly and 
morally to the norms that govern group affiliation and determine group 
membership.122 Genuine apologies and expressions of remorse, in other 
words, dissociate oneself from one’s wrongful past and make a plea for 
reconciliation.123 They are, as Tavuchis emphasizes, fundamentally 
relational. Remorse and apology are thus important to the crime-control 
projects of scholars like Brown, Kahan, and Katyal, though the traditional 
individual badness model ignores this role.124 Blinded by that model, 
criminal law scholars and commentators too often overlook this 
interpersonal dimension of remorse and apology.125 
 
120. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 13 (“Genuine apologies . . . may be taken as the 
symbolic foci of secular remedial rituals that serve to recall and reaffirm allegiance to codes of 
behavior and belief whose integrity has been challenged by transgression, whether knowingly or 
unwittingly.”); see also, e.g., Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage 
of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829, 845, 843-46 (2003) (“Apology 
dispels the perception that the victim is being ignored [and] validates the victim.” (citation 
omitted)); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in 
Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 461 (1986) (characterizing apology as 
“a crucial element in the recognition and restoration of human relationship”); infra Section II.C. 
121. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 14; see also id. at 7 (noting the “essential relational 
character of apology”); Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343 (noting that an “interpersonal orientation,” 
“stress[ing] a concern for the relationship between the victim and offender,” is “a key ingredient” 
in an effective apology (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
122. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 71, at 294 (“Genuine remorse . . . signals the offender’s 
affirmation of the legal norms of a community and his desire to be part of legitimate society.”); 
Pavlick, supra note 120, at 846 (discussing how remorse and apology “emphasize[] and 
reinforce[] the human values implicit to membership or ‘recertification’ in any moral community” 
(citation omitted)). 
123. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 14, at 1140 (explaining how an apologetic offender, while 
accepting responsibility for his actions, also commits himself to repent for his wrongful ways); 
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 120, at 475 (“An apology suggests change in attitude when the 
apologizer expresses remorse for past hurt and the commitment that future behavior will not be 
hostile and will make up for the rupture in relationship created by the hurtful act. . . . [A]n 
apologizing individual splits herself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part 
that disassociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule.”). 
124. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 41, at 1316 (predicating project on “influential 
[psychological] research [that] focuses on how group membership changes an individual’s 
personal identity to produce a new social identity”). 
125. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.  
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Sociologists, social psychologists, and scholars in other fields of law do 
not ignore this relational dimension. A rich and growing body of literature 
explores how remorse and apology build social norms, educate, and repair 
breaches in communities and relationships caused by wrongdoing.126 A 
broad consensus now supports Tavuchis’s central point: Because remorse 
and apology are fundamentally relational, any apologetic discourse must be 
“dyadic,” reflecting “an interaction between the primordial social categories 
of Offender and Offended.”127 Contrite offenders, in other words, do not 
just apologize for something. They also apologize to someone—their 
victims, their community, their family and their friends.128 Only by doing so 
can the remorseful offender “seek[] to re-affirm shared values with the 
receiver[] and look[] for re-certification of membership in the moral 
community.”129 And only in this way can the victim and others hurt by the 
wrong experience healing.130 
For this reason, many commentators view a face-to-face interaction 
between offender and offended as essential to effective expressions of 
remorse and apology. As Erin O’Hara and Douglas Yarn explain, “Remorse 
and its accompanying sorrow are often conveyed with body language and 
facial expression in face-to-face apologies.”131 These interactions allow 
nuanced communication that contextualizes the offender’s crime and the 
 
126. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120 and infra Subsection II.B.3 (examining the 
increasing attention to apology in civil mediation). Prior to Tavuchis’s work, only Wagatsuma and 
Rosett, in their comparative study of the role and uses of apology in Japan and United States, see 
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 120, had critically examined the importance of expressions of 
remorse and apology to social norms and the reconciliation of transgressors to their victims and 
communities. Hence Tavuchis, whose work appeared in 1991, noted that, in his attempt to explore 
the “wide[] social import” of apology, “[a]n extensive search of diverse sources, including 
anthropology, psychology, law, diplomacy, etiquette manuals, and literature . . . was not, for the 
most part, fruitful.” TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 3. Moreover, “sociology . . . and linguistics . . . 
had little to offer in the way of a sustained analysis of the essentials, forms, and functions of 
apology.” Id.  
127. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 46 (emphasis omitted); see also Taft, supra note 14, at 
1139. 
128. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 47 (“[A]pology is a relational concept and practice that 
necessarily requires an individual or collective Other to realize itself.”); Taft, supra note 14, at 
1142-43 (“[A]pology does not exist in isolation; it is, rather, an intensely relational process that 
cannot be understood alone any more than a promise could be understood without reference to 
promisor and promisee.”). 
129. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 836 (citations omitted); see also DUFF, supra note 66, at 114 
(arguing that a wrongdoer owes an apology not only to the direct victim of the crime but also to 
the community as a whole, “for the wrong done to the individual victim is also a wrong against 
the community, which shares that wrong and whose values have been flouted”). 
130. See infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.  
131. Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 
1121, 1134-35 (2002); see id. at 1135 (“More distant apologies often require explicit, and perhaps 
more extreme, statements of sorrow and regret.”); see also Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343 (noting 
that face-to-face interactions are central to effective apologies); Strang & Sherman, supra note  
42, at 28. 
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harm done.132 An offender “cannot simply rationalize the crime as being 
minor or harmless when a real person stands in front of him describing the 
physical and emotional pain directly flowing from his behavior.”133 By 
humanizing the transgression and its consequences, face-to-face interaction 
can break down pride, fear, pain, anxiety, and other barriers to accepting 
responsibility and thus pave the way for genuine repentance.134 Offenders 
can come to see that their crimes had real-world consequences and that their 
victims want and need to understand why the crime happened.135 Victims, 
likewise, can learn why the crime happened, receive needed assurance that 
it was not their fault, overcome their resentment, and see offenders as 
redeemable human beings.136 The entire process can provide a starting point 
for forgiveness and reintegration.137 
When offenders express genuine remorse in person to those offended, 
the effects can be profound.138 The news media and popular press are full of 
 
132. See Kathy Elton & Michelle M. Roybal, Restoration, A Component of Justice, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 43, 54 (observing that storytelling and dialogue between a victim and an offender 
can result in “obtaining a greater understanding of each other’s perspective through forthright and 
emotionally-intense dialogue”); see also Mark W. Bakker, Comment, Repairing the Breach and 
Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 
1483-90 (1984).  
133. Luna, supra note 71, at 300. 
134. See Garvey, supra note 72, at 314-15 (explaining that apologetic discourse between an 
offender and his victim can “bring an offender to understand and appreciate the full measure of 
the damage he has caused . . . [and] enable him to overcome mechanisms of defense and denial” 
and that “[t]he moral education and awakening of the offender that ideally takes place . . . is thus 
the offender’s first step on the road to atonement”); Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (“[T]he presence 
of the victim and his articulation of the harm he has suffered frustrate an offender’s attempt to 
neutralize the offense.”); Taft, supra note 14, at 1142; infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text. 
135. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 72, at 314 (explaining that an offender’s face-to-face 
meeting with his victim “brings home to the offender in painful detail the full measure of the 
injury he has caused” and allows him “to see his victim as a human being with standing equal to 
his own”); Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (explaining that an offender’s communication of genuine 
remorse to the victim in a face-to-face conference conveys his “respect for the victim . . . and 
validation of the right not to be victimized”). 
136. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (noting that an offender’s communication of 
genuine remorse to the victim in a face-to-face conference allows the victim to develop “respect 
for the offender as an individual capable of feeling positive emotions and taking responsibility for 
his actions”); Pavlick, supra note 120, at 845 (“Apology dispels the perception that the victim is 
being ignored [and] validates the victim.” (citation omitted)); Petrucci, supra note 66, at 343 
(noting that a face-to-face interaction “allows the victim to no longer feel shame because the 
victim sees . . . that it is the offender who is responsible for the harmful act, and not the victim”). 
137. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1840 (“[O]nce an offender has 
done everything possible to atone for his wrong, the burden shifts to the victim to forgive.”); Peter 
H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 116 
(“A sincere apology . . . can heal humiliation and generate forgiveness.”); Taft, supra note 14, at 
1142 (“[A]n apology sets in motion a call to the offended, a call for forgiveness.”). 
138. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients To Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 
1044 (1999) (noting that “[m]any practitioners report that apologies often work ‘magic’ or 
‘miracles,’” that “often an apology triggers like conduct from the recipient,” and that “even when 
one is highly skeptical that an apology will ‘do any good,’ it often does”); Garvey, Shaming 
Punishments, supra note 9, at 792 (discussing the “almost magical character” of genuine 
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stories about the transformative effects of such meetings. Empirical studies 
and anecdotal evidence from restorative justice programs confirm that face-
to-face expressions of remorse and apology matter immensely to offenders 
and victims. Four empirical studies involving 550 offenders found that 74% 
of offenders apologized when given the opportunity to do so in restorative-
justice conferences.139 By contrast, 71% of offenders whose only 
opportunity to apologize came in the courtroom did not do so.140 According 
to these studies, offenders who took part in restorative-justice conferences 
were 6.9 times more likely to apologize than those who went to court, and 
victims were 2.6 times more likely to forgive them.141 Offenders who have 
the opportunity to meet with victims often apologize even when they start 
off vowing not to.142 In return, many victims accept the apologies and 
forgive.143 Numerous studies show that a substantial percentage of victims 
want to meet with offenders.144 “The [empirical] evidence suggests that 
victims see emotional reconciliation to be far more important than material 
or financial reparation.”145 According to one study, the more that victims 
are emotionally upset by the offense, the more they want to meet with 
offenders.146 
Victims, offenders, and community members who have met and 
engaged in apologetic discourse overwhelmingly feel satisfied and relieved. 
Offenders who were interviewed, for example, reported feeling “happy, 
 
apologies); Pavlick, supra note 120, at 846 (observing that the effect of an apology “on the human 
condition often can be magical”). 
139. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological 
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 189; see also O’Hara & Yarn, supra 
note 131, at 1123 (“Wrongdoers often want to be forgiven, and concomitantly, may feel an urge to 
apologize.”). 
140. Poulson, supra note 139, at 189.  
141. Id. (describing the differences between restorative-justice and court participants as 
“consistently large” and statistically significant across all four studies). 
142. See Diane Whiteley, The Victim and the Justification of Punishment, CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1998, at 42, 51. 
143. Id.  
144. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 17-23. 
145. Id. at 22; cf. Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 
185 (2000) (noting that in a study of the experiences of victims of sexual assault with civil 
litigation and government compensation, most of the claimants stated they were pursuing their 
claim out of a “desire to be heard, have their experience validated, and receive an apology”). 
146. JOANNA MATTINSON & CATRIONA MIRRLEES-BLACK, HOME OFFICE, RESEARCH 
STUDY NO. 200, ATTITUDES TO CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FINDINGS FROM THE 1998 
BRITISH CRIME SURVEY 43 (2000), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors200.pdf; see also 
Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (1997) 
(“[A]pology has proven much more effective in major criminal mediations, where the injury was 
horribly severe, than in commercial contract cases, where the injury may be regarded as less 
serious.” (footnote omitted)). For an excellent overview and summary of the available evidence on 
the role of and importance to victims and offenders of apologies in face-to-face meetings, see 
MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIALOGUE: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MEDIATION, CONFERENCING AND CIRCLES (2003), 
http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/RJAnnotations%20June%202003.pdf.  
FLIPPED_BIBAS.DOC 9/28/2004 9:50 PM 
2004]  Integrating Remorse and Apology 117 
 
because all my feelings were out.”147 They “liked being able to apologize” 
“[t]o let [the victim] know that we are not bad.”148 They “fe[lt] better” 
because they “knew it was settled,” and felt “it was important to tell the 
victim that the crime was not personal and that [the offender] was sorry.”149 
Offenders welcomed the chance to “explain their own behavior, apologize, 
ease their consciences and reduce feelings of guilt.”150 Victims, likewise, 
felt they had been given “a chance for healing[,] a chance for information-
sharing[,] a chance for building relationships instead of destroying them.”151 
They explained that “it’s a healing-type thing” and that they were able to 
“get over [their] sense of loss.”152  
While preliminary studies are encouraging, it is still too early to be sure 
precisely how these opportunities affect long-term recidivism rates. But 
empirical studies of restorative justice programs show that they control 
crime at least as well, if not better than, traditional criminal justice.153 And 
they bring the added benefits of vindicating victims, healing and 
reconciling victims and offenders, reaffirming social norms, and morally 
educating offenders and citizens. Though criminal procedure often overlooks 
these values, they are of fundamental importance to the criminal law.154 
 
147. MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
AND MEDIATION 101 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149. Caren L. Flaten, Victim-Offender Mediation: Application with Serious Offenses 
Committed by Juveniles, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 387, 396 
(Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150. Lutz Netzig & Thomas Trenczek, Restorative Justice as Participation: Theory, Law, 
Experience and Research, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 149, at 241, 256 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
151. UMBREIT, supra note 147, at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Poulson, 
supra note 139, at 189 (noting that offenders’ apologies “can have particularly important 
psychological benefits to . . . victims”); Shuman, supra note 145, at 189 (“Although limited, the 
available theoretical, anecdotal, and empirical evidence all point[s] to the therapeutic potential of 
apology. Our consistent experience is that apologies are often an important part of the healing 
process.”); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 33 (reporting research from a restorative justice 
study showing that the number of victims who felt that participation in a restorative process 
involving the potential for apologetic discourse with the offender had allowed them to achieve 
closure and put the crime behind them outweighed those who did not by three to one). 
152.  Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal 
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 294 (2001) (quoting UMBREIT, supra note 147, at 95) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
153. Strang and Sherman, for example, surveying much of the existing evidence from 
restorative justice, conclude that restorative justice has always worked either as well as or, in 
some cases, clearly better than more traditional prosecution methods in controlling repeat 
offending. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 38. They further note that “[t]he evidence to 
date consistently falsifies,” and that “[a]ll of the available evidence contradicts,” the notion that an 
emphasis on restorative processes as opposed to traditional command-and-control measures will 
lead to more crime. Id. at 38, 41; see also UMBREIT ET AL., supra note 146, at 2-3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 18, 
21-22, 25, 30, 32-33, 35, 38, 40-41, 44 (summarizing studies addressing recidivism). Section III.B 
addresses the recidivism question in more detail. 
154. See supra Section I.A. 
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Of course, remorse and apology are not panaceas for the problems of 
crime control and the distress, pain, disrupted relationships, and other 
effects of crime. Expressing remorse and apologizing can be extremely 
difficult for offenders for any number of reasons. Tavuchis observes that 
such expressions can be “as painful and devastating as, if not worse than, 
any form of physical retribution.”155 Apologies can go wrong.156 Not all 
offenders are remorseful or willing to turn toward genuine repentance. Not 
all victims or community members want to hear an apology or meet an 
offender face to face.157 In most cases, victims do not view apologies as 
substitutes for punishment, as we discuss in Section II.C.158 Some apologies 
are half-hearted or insincere. And when parties do meet, some inevitably 
come away feeling dissatisfied.159 Nonetheless, remorse and apology are 
more than mere evidence of an offender’s true character, or reasons for a 
sentence reduction, or even creative sanctioning mechanisms. Ideally, they 
should be integral parts of criminal procedure, serving relational values and 
not just deterrence and retribution. In fact, even feigned expressions of 
remorse and apology can serve many of these values, as Section III.F 
discusses. Viewing remorse and apology through the individual badness 
model, judges and scholars have been too slow to see how the social value 
of remorse and apology can further the criminal law’s core aims. 
3. Lessons from Noncriminal Contexts: Civil Mediation 
Unlike the criminal law, other areas of law have begun to use remorse 
and apology in reconciliation rituals. The state’s interests are stronger in the 
 
155. TAVUCHIS, supra note 12, at 35; see Pavlick, supra note 120, at 851-53 (outlining 
potential psychological barriers to apology). 
156. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 14, at 1142 (noting that apologies can be “difficult, pain-filled, 
and potentially humiliating”); Levi, supra note 146, at 1181 (observing that apologies can be 
“acutely susceptible to miscalculation, impasse, uncertainty, and failure to achieve desired ends”); 
supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting psychological barriers that can obstruct remorse and 
apology); cf. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 77-90 (2003) (arguing that “faking it” is a 
ritualized and almost integral part of any real apology). 
157. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 145, at 184 (“Not all victims find apologies soothing and 
apologies do not respond to all wrongs.”); Interview with Paul Engelmayer, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the SDNY, 1989-1994 and 1996-1999, in New York, N.Y. 
(Mar. 26, 2004) (observing that in cases of financial crimes involving only monetary harm to 
victims, victims generally “wanted their money back and the defendants in jail and out of their 
lives”). But see supra notes 144-146 and infra note 298 (citing studies concluding that victims in 
general view the possibility of emotional reconciliation and healing after a crime as very 
important). 
158. See Robinson, supra note 72, at 381 (observing that few people would think that “justice 
was done” if “a serious wrongdoer [were] free to skip away to a happy life, even if he genuinely 
apologized to [his victim]”); infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. 
159. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 145, at 185 (noting that sexual assault victims who did not 
receive an apology “were seriously disappointed”); Taft, supra note 14, at 1141 (stating that a 
botched apology “can strain relationships or fuel bitter vengeance”). 
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criminal than in the civil context, of course, which explains why remorse 
and apology should not substitute for punishment. But the criminal law 
could do both, satisfying the state’s interest in punishment as well as 
learning from civil mediation how to serve offenders’ and victims’ 
interests. Civil mediation scholarship emphasizes that expressions of 
remorse and apology can be valuable ways to resolve disputes.160 Scholars 
and commentators in this area stress the need for corresponding legal 
reforms to facilitate the social and relational benefits of remorse and 
apology. For example, the rules of evidence may need to exclude some 
apology-related statements from evidence, and legal education should train 
law students and lawyers in successful mediation.161 
Empirical findings support the usefulness of this approach. Victims 
frequently value genuine expressions of sorrow and contrition more than 
monetary compensation,162 and will often forgo money in the face of such 
expressions. For example, in one study published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, nearly one-fourth of families who sued their 
physicians following prenatal injuries reported doing so primarily because 
their physicians “had failed to be completely honest with them about what 
happened.”163 Similarly, in the sexual assault context, researchers have 
found that “[m]ost [civil] claimants . . . were interested in pursuing their 
claim for therapeutic rather than financial reasons. They identified the 
desire to be heard, have their experience validated, and receive an apology 
as important aspects of their therapeutic expectations for the legal 
 
160. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, 
MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 159-60 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that “[t]he first lesson of 
dispute resolution that many of us learn as children is the importance of apologizing” and going 
on to explain that an “apology is valuable in repairing whatever harm to the relationship has 
resulted from the dispute” and that “[m]any mediators have had one or more experiences . . . in 
which an apology was the key to a settlement that might otherwise not have been attainable”); 
Pavlick, supra note 120; Levi, supra note 146. 
161. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SCANLON, MEDIATOR’S DESKBOOK 68 (1999) (raising “the 
possibility of an apology as a component of resolving the dispute” in the checklist of mediator’s 
techniques); O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 131, at 1169-83 (arguing for evidentiary reforms to better 
realize the value of apology in litigation); Marshall H. Tanick & Teresa J. Ayling, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Saying “I’m Sorry,” HENNEPIN LAW., July-Aug. 
1996, at 22, 22 (arguing for proactive use of apology in mediation); see also Cohen, supra note 
138, at 1032-36, 1061-63. In light of these developments, several states have amended their 
evidentiary rules to provide safe harbors for apology. See Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: 
Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. 
U. L. REV. 221, 247-48 (1999); Latif, supra note 152, at 301. 
162. See supra notes 144-146. 
163. Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families To File Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Prenatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992), cited in Jonathan R. Cohen, 
Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1447, 1458 (2000). 
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process.”164 And in the defamation context, many plaintiffs care more about 
apologies than money. This is partly because retractions counteract 
reputational harm, but also partly because refusals to apologize antagonize 
victims. Many pursue litigation only after publishers rebuff their requests 
for retractions and apologies.165 
Developments in mediation practice reflect the trend toward apology. 
Remorse and apology are increasingly seen as central elements in 
successful mediation.166 The sessions focus “on the parties’ interests rather 
than on their legal position or rights. Parties have the opportunity to tell 
their story, to explain their needs, and to vent their feelings.”167 This 
discourse is designed to foster discussion of moral and interpersonal 
obligations as well as legal ones.168 As Donna Pavlick explains, mediation 
is “an opportunity to connect face-to-face and engage in interactive 
negotiation that is beyond purely adversarial behavior.”169 Mediation thus 
lets parties “confront the substantive . . . values at the core of their 
relationship” and provides an “opportunity for the [offender] to apologize 
and for the victim to forgive.”170 In other words, mediation encourages the 
parties to express themselves emotionally and morally. This 
encouragement, glaringly absent from adversarial litigation, is intensely 
important in overcoming psychological barriers, allowing defendants to 
 
164. Shuman, supra note 145, at 185 (citing Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensation 
for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 433 (1998)). 
165. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 79-
94, 159-68, 172, 228-33 (1987) (finding that many plaintiffs would initially be content with 
apologies but that, after defendants rebuff their requests, many shift to litigation to vindicate and 
punish); see also id. at 159-68, 172, 228-33 (finding that plaintiffs would consider forgoing 
litigation if a mediation alternative were open to them but that they sue because they lack 
alternative avenues of redress); id. at 232 (suggesting that defense lawyers might not naturally 
support mediation because it cuts against their financial interest). 
166. See O’Hara & Yarn, supra note 131, at 1126 (“Failure to take into account these human 
tastes for apology and forgiveness can have significant consequences, . . . [which] have 
historically garnered little attention from our formal legal system. Recently, proponents of 
apology and forgiveness, particularly from the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement, 
have urged increased sensitivity to the uses and nuances of these behaviors and their effect on the 
resolution of disputes.”). 
167. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 857. 
168. Levi, supra note 146, at 1171 (citing Craig A. McEwan & Richard J. Maiman, 
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION 
RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 53, 60 (Kenneth 
Kressel et al. eds., 1989)). 
169. Pavlick, supra note 120, at 857. Pavlick goes on to note that “[t]he parties often can 
settle their differences and effectively resolve the dispute. They can restore the moral balance of 
power.” Id. at 857-58. 
170. Id. 
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acknowledge legal and moral responsibility, and providing victims with 
needed moral recompense.171 
The contrast between civil mediation and criminal litigation could not 
be more stark. Clearly, these two fields differ significantly, and the parallels 
are not perfect. Nonetheless, civil mediation’s current direction is very 
different from criminal justice’s emphasis on offenders as individuals and 
its focus on procedural values to the exclusion of substantive concerns. 
Because routine civil cases are much less about individual blame, 
retribution, and procedural rights, civil law has found it easier to mine the 
substantive social value of remorse and apology.172 
C. The Practical Import of the Relational Perspective 
Different readers might implement the preceding theoretical discussion 
in different ways. Most restorative justice enthusiasts, such as Braithwaite, 
treat remorse and apology as wholesale substitutes for the allegedly cruel, 
backward instrument of punishment.173 In Braithwaite’s view, “Restorative 
justice is most commonly defined by what it is an alternative to,” namely 
the punishment-centered “justice model.”174 According to this view, 
 
171. See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR 
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS § 7.1, at 188 (1996); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 160, at 159-62; 
Levi, supra note 146, at 1171; see also JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 220-35 (1989) (discussing the importance of psychological 
and interpersonal variables to successful dispute resolution). 
172. This parallel is evident in the reparations context as well, where victims of historical 
injustices have no clear legal claims against wrongdoers. There, both theoretical and 
overwhelming practical problems limit reliance on deterrence, retributivism, and individual rights. 
Apologies thus become an “important form of in-kind reparation” because they “transfer to 
recipients a valuable intangible benefit, that of moral acknowledgment of historical injustice.” 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 689, 729-30 (2003). They also simultaneously help “to remove the stain of moral 
taint” from the apologizer—often a high-level official speaking on behalf of a country or its 
institutions—by acknowledging the failure of the apologizer’s institutions to prevent the injustice. 
Id. at 709, 709-10. Expressions of remorse, contrition, and apology are likewise central to truth 
and reconciliation commissions because of similar practical and theoretical problems with 
inflicting retribution, deterring, and serving individual rights. See, e.g., Brandon Hamber, Rights 
and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1074, 1083 (2003) (noting importance of expressions of remorse and apology to 
addressing consequences of victimhood and promoting truth and reconciliation through the use of 
formal commissions); Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in 
Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 394-98 (1999) (discussing pragmatic and political 
problems in the use of criminal prosecutions for violations of human rights committed during 
apartheid in South Africa); Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military 
Regimes: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 139 
(2003) (discussing the importance of expressions of remorse and “genuine contrition on the part 
of perpetrators” to achieving “‘reconciliation and forgiveness as a basis for peace and unity’” in 
Nigeria through a proposed truth commission (quoting President Obasanjo of Nigeria)).  
173. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
174. Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 4. 
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“retribution is in the same category as greed or gluttony,” a vice that is 
“corrosive of human health and relationships.”175 Many proponents view 
restorative justice as inconsistent with the criminal justice system’s 
assignment of blame because they fear that blame hinders acceptance of 
responsibility and healing.176 Thus, they stress that laypeople should run 
restorative justice procedures as an alternative to the cold, professionalized, 
punitive machinery of the criminal justice system.177 At most, they argue, 
criminal punishment should be a fallback for those offenders who refuse to 
apologize or make restitution.178 
Many restorative justice programs function in just this way, either by 
displacing adjudication entirely or by substituting for the tail end of 
criminal procedure. Vermont, for example, reserves traditional criminal 
punishment for violent offenders and other felons who are likely to 
recidivate. A reparative track handles mild to moderately serious crimes, 
such as burglary, attempted grand larceny, drunk driving, fraud, theft, 
underage drinking, simple assault, and drug possession. These offenders are 
adjudicated guilty in the traditional justice system but are not punished. 
Instead, they enter a reparative program that requires them to make amends, 
take classes, and write essays on the importance of the law and their 
crimes.179 Salt Lake City diverts misdemeanants with no history of violence 
to restorative justice programs. If offenders attend classes, pay restitution of 
no more than $180, and listen to victims of other crimes talk about their 
experiences, prosecutors dismiss their cases.180 
We do not embrace this dichotomy between apology and punishment 
because it guts the solemn force of the criminal sanction. At least where the 
offender has significantly wronged an identifiable victim, excusing him 
 
175. Id. at 7; see also Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles 
in Restorative Justice Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 57, 77 (“‘Retributive,’ ‘punitive,’ and 
‘offender-based’ perspectives are seen as in tension with the value of restoration, and it is the job 
of the restorative justice professional to correct or modify these perspectives . . . .”). 
176. See Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 72 (“Another widely but not universally 
acknowledged distinction is that restorative justice does not apply to the blame-fixing stage of the 
criminal justice process.” (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION 35-36 (2002))). 
177. Id. at 64 (“Restorative justice theory at times seems to imply little need for professionals 
at all.”); id. at 87, 87-88 (noting that “the idea of de-professionalizing . . . is such a strong element 
of restorative justice theory,” even though in practice program administrators tend to become 
more professional); cf. id. at 76 (“A core value of the traditional criminal justice system that has 
less resonance in restorative justice is protecting the rights of offenders.”). 
178. See Braithwaite, Holism, supra note 72, at 404 (“[A]tonement has more power in 
affirming a just moral order than punishment. But when criminals eschew atonement, 
punishment—or at least some solemn public condemnation of the crime—is needed to affirm that 
moral order and to vindicate victims.”); see also Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 76 (“If 
offenders utterly fail to comply with [Salt Lake City’s restorative justice program requirements], 
they are referred back to the court for entry of the conviction and normal sentencing.”).  
179. Olson & Dzur, supra note 175, at 65-68 & n.30. 
180. Id. at 68-71. 
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from punishment belittles the crime and the harm. Offenders, victims, and 
society interpret the failure to punish to mean that the crime is not really 
wrong and that the offender is free to keep doing it.181 As Judge Morris 
Hoffman fears, restorative justice without punishment becomes “a de facto 
decriminalization of certain minor offenses which the mavens of the 
movement do not think should be punished, but which our Puritan ethos 
commands cannot be ignored.”182 Restorative justice requires no amends to 
right the imbalanced scales of justice and no bite to underscore society’s 
condemnation of the crime. As Garvey cogently puts it, 
Missing from the restorativist agenda . . . is the idea of punishment 
as moral condemnation. . . . 
. . . Restorativism cannot achieve the victim’s restoration if it 
refuses to vindicate the victim’s worth through punishment. Nor 
can it restore the offender, who can only atone for his wrong if he 
willingly submits to punishment. And if neither the victim nor the 
wrongdoer is restored, then neither is the community of which they 
are a part.183  
While most restorative justice programs supplant punishment for some 
categories of cases, a few have begun to blend mediation and punishment. 
For example, the University of Wisconsin Law School has begun a 
restorative justice project that arranges mediation in prison between 
offenders and victims or their relatives.184 During one mediation session, an 
attempted murderer accepted responsibility, broke down in tears, and 
hugged his victim, who in turn forgave him.185 In another, the mother of a 
rape and stabbing victim asked to meet with the rapist, who had steadfastly 
 
181. Cf. DUFF, supra note 66, at 143-55 (discussing the communicative dimensions of 
different types of sanctions); MORRIS, supra note 63, at 104 (“Central to punishment of others . . . 
is a communicative act. . . . Punishment is deprivatory conduct that means something.”); Kahan, 
supra note 9, at 619-24 (noting that citizens view fines as inadequate punishment for serious 
offenses because they fail to express condemnation and allow an offender to “buy his way out,” 
pay the fine, and continue to commit crime (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
182. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial 
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
2063, 2067 (2002). 
183. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1844. As discussed earlier, a few 
supporters of restorative justice have admitted that punishment might occasionally be necessary 
for serious crimes or unrepentant offenders. See, e.g., Zehr, supra note 72. Even this concession, 
however, is not enough. It does not recognize that for most crimes of more than minimal 
seriousness, punishment is needed to underscore the community’s denunciation of the crime and 
vindication of the victim. 
184. See Frank J. Remington Ctr., Restorative Justice Project, http://www.law.wisc.edu/ 
fjr/restorative/rjpvoc.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
185. Tag Evers, Blessed Are the Peace Makers, ISTHMUS (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 10-16, 1998, 
at 9.  
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claimed innocence during and after his trial. In the prison-based mediation, 
he broke down and admitted guilt.186 Likewise, the Iowa and Minnesota 
Departments of Corrections have begun prison-based victim-offender 
mediation, circles of support and accountability, family team meetings, and 
victim-impact classes for incarcerated offenders.187 Victims can ask 
offenders why the crime happened, give voice to their wounds, and heal.188 
To our knowledge, however, this intriguing fusion of mediation and 
punishment has gone largely unnoticed by the academic literature.189 
Other scholars, such as Kahan, emphasize using apology as a cost-
effective shaming sanction.190 These scholars say little about the interactive, 
face-to-face processes of voluntary remorse and apology and the 
accompanying healing and reconciliation. Instead, their idea is to “magnify 
the humiliation inherent in conviction” by “communicating the offender’s 
status to a wider audience,” “publicly disgrac[ing] the offender,” 
“requir[ing] offenders to publicize their own convictions,” or ordering 
offenders to make public or in-person apologies.191 Expressively satisfying 
shaming sanctions such as public humiliation, denunciation rituals, and 
forced apologies can deter offenders and denounce crime more cheaply than 
prison.192 Many commentators have pointed out the cruelty of this approach 
to shaming, and we will not rehash those arguments here.193 Our objection 
 
186. Id. 
187. Telephone Interview with Bruce Kittle, member of the board of directors of the Victim-
Offender Mediation Ass’n and chaplain, Iowa Dep’t of Corr. Servs. (Feb. 27, 2004); Minn. Dep’t 
of Corr., Sample Restorative Justice Practices in Minnesota, http://www.doc.state.mn.us/ 
aboutdoc/restorativejustice/rjsamples.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
188. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., History of Victim and Restorative Justice Programs, 
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/VictimHistory.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). 
189. Duff is the one significant exception. He does not examine the features of these 
programs in great detail, but he does try to integrate the idea of criminal mediation into a 
normative justification for punishment. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 88-106 (arguing for the 
increased use of mediation, probation, and community service orders as central to his theory of 
punishment as a communicative enterprise). 
190. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
191. Kahan, supra note 9, at 631-34; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 368 
(“Shaming is the process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the bad 
dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or 
engaging in those actions.”). 
192. See Kahan & Posner, supra note 45, at 368 (arguing that “shaming penalties could prove 
to be an efficient alternative to prison for white-collar offenders” because they “create strong 
economic and psychological disincentives against crime, and at only a small fraction of the cost of 
incarceration”); Skeel, supra note 67, at 1814-15 (arguing that the “moral disapproval” expressed 
by the “enforcer” through shaming sanctions can “have a chastening effect on actual offenders” 
and “can also discourage potential offenders from misbehaving in the first instance”). 
193. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 82-83 (1993) (criticizing 
shaming penalties as “demeaning rituals” and “attempts to humiliate” that disrespect offenders’ 
human dignity); Garvey, Shaming Punishments, supra note 9, at 759 (noting that “some 
contemporary shaming penalties do cross—or come close to crossing—the line” of humiliation 
and dehumanization); Massaro, supra note 68, at 1943 (criticizing shaming punishments in part 
because they are efforts to “search for and destroy or damage an offender’s dignity”). But cf. 
FLIPPED_BIBAS.DOC 9/28/2004 9:50 PM 
2004]  Integrating Remorse and Apology 125 
 
is a different one: By viewing apology as simply a means of humiliation, 
Kahan and others slight its positive role.194 Apology and remorse may be 
painful, but the main reason for using them is not to inflict pain or satisfy 
the community’s bloodlust. Nor should they serve to ostracize offenders; on 
the contrary, they are tools for drawing offenders back toward the fold. In 
Braithwaite’s terminology, remorse and apology should be reintegrative 
shaming sanctions rather than disintegrative ones.195 They can heal and 
strengthen wounded relationships. Remorse and apology are valuable not 
because pain is good per se, but because they underscore communal norms, 
reaffirm offenders’ moral personalities, and heal victims, offenders, and 
their communities. 
In short, remorse and apology are neither substitutes for punishment nor 
cruel, ostracizing forms of punishment. Instead, remorse and apology 
should supplement but not supplant punishment. The values served by 
remorse and apology should be more integral parts of the process of 
prosecution and punishment. For the criminal law to regulate society 
effectively and morally educate, it must serve the values of remorse and 
apology in addition to deterring crimes, inflicting retribution, and protecting 
defendants’ rights.196 Our proposal synthesizes the strengths of restorative 
justice and Kahan’s shaming approach while avoiding their weaknesses. 
Restorativists demonstrate how remorse and apology can reconcile and 
heal, while shaming advocates show how remorse and apology can express 
condemnation of crime and reinforce norms. Each extreme overemphasizes 
one important piece of the puzzle at the expense of the other. 
Currently, however, our criminal justice system is largely a punishment 
assembly line dominated by prosecutors and defense counsel, in which 
 
James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 
(1998) (rejecting shaming sanctions not because they are cruel to the offender but because “[t]hey 
represent an unacceptable style of governance through their play on public psychology”). 
194. As Kahan explains, the contrition and apology penalties touted by shaming scholars 
often “combine stigmatizing publicity with an element of [forced] self-debasement.” Kahan, supra 
note 9, at 634. While in some cases the penalties “contemplate genuine rapprochement,” in most 
cases they do not, and “the sincerity of the offenders’ remorse seems largely irrelevant.” Id. 
195. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54-97 (1989); Michael 
Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1763-71 
(1999) (criticizing Kahan’s embrace of disintegrative shaming punishments). But cf. Dan M. 
Kahan, Unspeakable Misrepresentations: A Response to Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1933, 1934-35 
(1999) (insisting that his aim is not to sate the public’s desires for debasement and degradation 
and that in fact shaming penalties are less degrading than imprisonment). 
196. The two scholars whose approaches come close to ours are Stephen Garvey and R.A. 
Duff. Garvey, however, focuses on building a theoretical model of punishment that includes some 
of these concepts. He does not really discuss how to import these ideas into actual criminal 
procedure and the disposition of cases. See Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 
1810-29. Similarly, Duff largely restricts his discussion of remorse and apology to their 
communicative functions in the mediation context as part of his overall theoretical project of 
justifying punishment as purposive communication. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 79-125. 
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other actors unfortunately fade into the background. How should remorse 
and apology change the roles of offenders, victims, and society? 
For offenders, we need to move beyond the individual badness model. 
Remorse and apology should be about much more than simply how much 
deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution an offender needs. Rather, they 
are important ways to promote education, expiation, and restoration. Until 
offenders express remorse or apologize, they often hide behind self-serving 
denials and distortions. Denial impedes treatment and moral reform, as 
offenders refuse to admit that they need to change their behavior. It also 
keeps offenders from acknowledging their moral agency and acting as 
responsible, law-abiding citizens. Denial and resistance to treatment can 
thus greatly increase the risk of recidivism.197 
At the same time, we must not view remorse and apology as helping 
victims at the expense of offenders. This zero-sum adversarial mentality 
overlooks how remorse and apology can benefit offenders as well as 
victims. Offenders who come to terms with their crimes and apologize start 
on the path to reform. They learn valuable lessons and feel better about 
themselves as persons. They may thus become less likely to recidivate and 
are prime candidates for mercy to temper criminal justice.198 
Victims also need to play a larger role. The relational process of 
apology gives them much-needed opportunities to achieve catharsis and to 
learn that the crime was not personal or their fault.199 The process needs to 
allow plenty of points at which victims can participate and benefit from 
expressions of remorse and apology. Many victims will understandably be 
reluctant to go through the process for fear of reliving traumatic moments 
and seeing the offenders again. The criminal justice system should not force 
victims or offenders to take part, but it should persistently but gently 
encourage them to do so. For example, mediation programs let victims and 
offenders bring friends, relatives, victim advocates, or clergy to the 
mediation. These third parties can allay victims’ fears and encourage 
offenders to make amends.200 Mediators reinforce victims’ sense of safety 
and empowerment by soliciting their input on the location, scheduling, 
 
197. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1395-96. 
198. See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
199. See FLETCHER, supra note 58, at 248 (endorsing a German proposal to have victims 
approve all plea bargains, which would require facilitating understanding between victims and 
offenders, would empower victims, and so might lessen the need for additional victim vindication 
at a public trial). 
200. MARK S. UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 21, 23, 29, 32 
(2001); Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Justice 
Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, 6-7. 
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layout, and conduct of the mediation.201 Apology procedures such as these 
can help to empower victims and supplement restitution, though they do not 
supplant it. 
Society has a role to play as well. Offenders have wronged society, not 
just identifiable victims, by disregarding its norms and sowing fear and 
disorder. Remorse and apology help to affirm communal norms and restore 
the moral balance. Our criminal justice system should recognize the 
community’s legitimate stake in the process, even if in some cases its role is 
largely symbolic. Though the primary recipients of apologies and restitution 
must be victims, the processes of remorse and apology should take place 
with the encouragement and blessing of the community.202 Juries and 
judges, as voices of the community, should more clearly articulate these 
functions.203 
In sum, prosecutors and defense counsel currently dominate criminal 
procedure and leave little room for remorse or apology. To take these 
practices seriously, criminal procedure must acknowledge the social, 
relational dimension of crime and give greater roles to other important 
actors. It should encourage offenders, victims, and society’s representatives 
to work through the process of apology and reconciliation. The next Part 
discusses concrete procedural changes that might better achieve these goals. 
III.  IMPLEMENTING REMORSE AND APOLOGY 
While some academics have theorized about the benefits of remorse 
and apology, few have tried to translate theory into practice. At most, 
scholars and practitioners generally assume that the natural place for 
remorse and apology is at sentencing. This assumption goes hand in  
hand with the assumption that remorse and apology are really about the 
amount of punishment that the individual offender needs. This cramped 
 
201. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 21-25. Mediators should also support victims and 
offenders by using sensitive language, not pushing too hard, and ensuring that the parties 
participate voluntarily. Id. at 22-27.  
202. See Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 200, at 6-7 (discussing how sentencing circles 
empower community representatives by giving them a voice in choosing appropriate sentences); 
see also id. at 8 (noting that while victim-offender mediation limits the relevant community to 
these two participants, sentencing circles include as part of the community “anyone with a stake in 
the resolution of a crime who chooses to participate in the circle”). But see Robert Weisberg, 
Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 358-59 (criticizing 
the “contrived nature of the community setting” as an artifact created by proponents of restorative 
justice). 
203. See Linda Ross Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 
1532 (2000) (noting that the jury should serve as the “voice of the community, setting the terms of 
reintegration” of offenders back into the group); Katie Long, Note, Community Input at 
Sentencing: Victim’s Right or Victim’s Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 227 (1995) (advocating 
the use of local judges and juries to increase community input through these actors). 
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approach ignores the potential for fostering reconciliation throughout the 
criminal process. 
This Part explores how concrete procedures can foster the benefits of 
remorse and apology at every stage. Section A discusses the early stages of 
the criminal process, from before arrest to shortly after charging. Section B 
considers how victim-offender mediation and similar forms of alternative 
dispute resolution might work for certain types of crimes. These 
procedures, we argue, can supplement the criminal process and may 
occasionally supplant it for certain less serious crimes. Section C addresses 
the role of cooperating witnesses and the ways that prosecutors can 
encourage remorse and apology. Section D explores the role of victims’ 
rights throughout the criminal process, including long before sentencing. 
Section E proposes reforms to plea procedures. Section F suggests 
reforming sentencing to make it about more than just the individual 
offender’s badness. Finally, Section G considers the costs, difficulties, and 
tradeoffs that our proposals may involve. 
A. At the Beginning of the Criminal Process 
Though the public may think of arrest and charging as automatic 
events, these decisions involve substantial discretion. Police have wide 
latitude in deciding whether to arrest an individual and file charges. 
Likewise, prosecutors can choose whether to accept police officers’ 
recommendations and pursue those charges. Particularly for lower-level 
crimes, police may not arrest and prosecutors may decline to charge or may 
divert cases for alternative resolution after charging.204 
Remorse and apology could play a much larger role in these decisions. 
Moving in this direction would not require changing existing law; police 
and prosecutors would simply have to use their existing discretion with an 
eye toward encouraging remorse and apology. While some probably use 
their discretion in this way already, there is room to do more. Of course, a 
simple apology is no substitute for arrest and prosecution of a crime of 
violence. But the bulk of crimes are relatively minor, including petty thefts 
and vandalism.205 In these cases, informal resolution may resolve cases 
 
204. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130 (2003) (authorizing deferred prosecution 
before or after the filing of charges, with possible dismissal of charges, except for driving while 
impaired); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.411 (2004) (authorizing prosecutors to decline to prosecute 
for a variety of reasons, including a request of the victim, particularly for minor assaults and 
nonviolent property crimes that result in no major loss). 
205. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203301, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 188 tbl.3.1 (2002), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (reporting that in 2001, there were more than three times as 
many property crimes as crimes against the person and that 77% of these property crimes were 
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better than arrest and prosecution. By forgoing arrest or delaying it pending 
restitution and amends, the system can promote face-to-face interaction 
between offenders and victims.206 In appropriate cases, the result may be 
apology and reconciliation. Offenders may better appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their acts, while victims may find the swift apology 
satisfying. And by bringing in parents or other authority figures, the law can 
reinforce the moral authority of its pronouncements and the need for 
remorse, reform, and apology.207 
Even after arrest, prosecutors may decline to prosecute if a low-level 
offender expresses remorse and makes restitution or amends. Prosecutors 
can use the threat of charges as leverage by deferring prosecution or 
diverting cases to alternative forums, ultimately dismissing the charges if 
offenders apologize and make amends. Pretrial diversion programs, of 
course, are already well established in many jurisdictions.208 Expressions of 
apology and contrition, moreover, often play significant roles in individual 
prosecutors’ decisions to make these alternative dispositions available to 
offenders.209 But prosecutors still use such programs sporadically and 
 
thefts or attempted thefts, of which 67% involved completed thefts of less than $250); id. at 451 
tbl.4.6 (reporting 8933 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters, 17,394 forcible rapes, and 
69,405 robberies in 2002, compared with 729,825 larcenies, 362,979 cases of drunkenness, 
398,728 cases of disorderly conduct, 169,842 cases of vandalism, and 51,275 cases of prostitution 
and commercialized vice). 
206. Requiring restitution and amends may promote the face-to-face interaction that leads to 
apology, though restitution is no substitute for apology. Deborah Levi relates the following 
example of one such use of remorse and apology: 
[I]n one case of neighborhood vandalism, nine families became involved in restoring 
damage done to the victim’s home. Each child involved apologized to the homeowner 
and explained the details of the damage he had caused. Then each child paid twenty-
eight dollars that he, not his parents, earned in order to pay for repairs. Lastly, each 
child promised not to retaliate against the homeowner’s son. 
   . . . The payments reimbursed the victim for the damage . . . ; the promises 
restored the homeowner’s sense of security in the neighborhood; and the apology 
vindicated the homeowner’s sense of moral indignation while his forgiveness 
reconciled the neighbors. 
Levi, supra note 146, at 1202 (footnote omitted). 
207. See Luna, supra note 71, at 300 (“[T]he presence of the young person’s family, their 
personal condemnation of the offense, and the visible signs of anguish felt by family members 
confronted by the harm caused by their own kin all provide exceptionally powerful signals to the 
juvenile on the wrongfulness of his conduct.”). 
208. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40 (McKinney 2004) (providing for the 
dismissal of a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint in the interests of justice); id. 
§ 170.55 (providing for the adjournment of criminal charges in contemplation of dismissal); 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-22.000 (1997) (providing for the 
possibility of pretrial diversion for certain crimes).   
209. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1)(d) (McKinney 2004) (directing the court 
to consider, among other things, “the history, character and condition of the defendant” in ruling 
on a motion to dismiss in the interests of justice); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 208, § 9-22.100 
(leaving solely to the discretion of the U.S. Attorney the decision whether to “divert any 
individual against whom a prosecutable case exists,” so long as the individual is not charged with 
certain specified offenses); Interview with Paul Engelmayer, supra note 157 (characterizing 
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inconsistently, with great variation among jurisdictions.210 This is 
particularly true when it comes to institutionalizing prosecutorial efforts to 
facilitate direct, interactive expressions of remorse and apology through 
diversion. Unlike traditional restorative justice enthusiasts,211 we do not see 
remorse and apology as wholesale substitutes for criminal punishment. But 
in appropriate minor cases, expressions of remorse, apology, and perhaps 
promises of restitution may suffice. 
The biggest objection to this proposal is that discretion allows police 
and prosecutors to discriminate, consciously or unconsciously, based on 
race and other characteristics. This risk of discrimination is especially 
troubling because race, sex, and class may color assessments of remorse 
and apology.212 While this risk of discrimination is real and pervasive, it is 
already inherent in existing prosecutorial and police discretion. Indeed, a 
deliberate focus on remorse and apology might help to structure this 
discretion, making it less susceptible to arbitrariness and discrimination. 
Prosecutors might promulgate written policies that spell out criteria for 
declining or diverting minor cases in which offenders apologize and begin 
to make amends. No law can eradicate all danger of discrimination, but 
policies that are sensitive to this danger can reduce its risk. 
B. Victim-Offender Mediation and Similar Mechanisms 
In the last few decades, communities have experimented with various 
voluntary, nonadversarial processes for bringing offenders, crime victims, 
and others together. Victim-offender mediation brings offenders (especially 
juveniles) and victims face to face.213 Community reparative boards allow 
panels of trained citizens to discuss crimes with offenders and agree on 
restitution plans.214 Family group conferences bring together the families of 
 
“admission of wrongdoing and remorse” as “conditions” to the use of diversionary programs); 
Interview with Peter Vigeland, Assistant Dist. Attorney, Manhattan Dist. Attorney’s Office, 1980-
1984, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 26, 2004) (noting that “expressions of contrition certainly helped” 
in local prosecutors’ eyes when considering whether to move for an adjournment in contemplation 
of dismissal under section 170.40 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law).  
210. See, e.g., Thomas E. Ulrich, Pretrial Diversion in the Federal Court System, FED. 
PROBATION, Dec. 2002, at 30, 34 (noting that while a handful of federal districts diverted 30% or 
more of their total pretrial supervision caseloads between 1995 and 1999, there was wide variation 
and other districts diverted only 2% of their pretrial supervision cases). We recognize that the 
more leverage the system employs to press for remorse and apology, the greater the danger that 
these expressions will be insincere. We discuss this issue infra Section III.F. We also recognize 
that any benefits tied to making amends must take into account the offender’s means. In other 
words, a poor offender who credibly commits to make restitution should not suffer simply because 
he lacks the wealth to pay restitution immediately. 
211. See supra notes 173-183 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
213. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 200, at 2. 
214. Id. at 3. 
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offenders and victims to discuss crimes, mediated by a trained facilitator.215 
Sentencing circles allow victims, offenders, the friends and family of both, 
community members, and justice professionals to deliberate and agree upon 
a sentence.216 While these four models differ slightly, each lets victims 
explain how crimes affected them, ask questions, develop restitution plans, 
seek apologies, and air their sorrows. In turn, offenders learn about their 
victims’ sufferings; ideally, apologize and commit to making amends; and 
heal the guilt that might otherwise plague their conscience.217 Many 
programs also incorporate victims’ and offenders’ family and friends, to 
provide support, encouragement, and oversight as offenders commit to 
change. Victims can more easily express their pain and anger with loved 
ones at their sides. Offenders are skilled at denying or minimizing their 
crimes, but the tears of their parents or siblings can pierce these denials and 
drive home the need for change.218 
These nascent mechanisms can be quite successful. A meta-analysis of 
empirical studies found that victim-offender mediation and family 
conferencing (hereinafter “mediation”) was consistently more successful 
than traditional criminal justice in a variety of ways: 82% of victims whose 
cases were handled in mediation believed that the criminal justice system 
was fair, versus 56% of those in court.219 Likewise, 91% of offenders whose 
cases were handled in mediation thought the criminal justice system was 
fair, versus 78% of those in court.220 The same meta-analysis found that 
78% of victims in mediation were satisfied with the handling of their cases, 
 
215. Id. at 5. 
216. Id. at 6.  
217. Duff explains the basic criminal mediation process this way: 
Part of the point of the criminal mediation process consists . . . in th[e] exchange of 
explanations. The victim can explain her suffering to the offender . . . in [a way] that 
expresses and tries to communicate . . . her hurt and anger, and that condemns the crime 
as a wrong. She will also have a chance to come to understand (which will not be to 
condone) the offender’s action from his perspective. The offender will be vividly 
confronted, through his victim’s voice, with his crime. But he will also have a chance to 
explain himself.  
DUFF, supra note 66, at 93.  
218. See Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 47-49 (noting that offenders frequently deny that there 
was a victim, that the victim suffered injury, that they were responsible for their actions, that their 
actions were blameworthy, or that the victim was in the right, and noting that, while offenders 
may deflect shame from themselves, seeing the shame of their loved ones at their deeds may spur 
them to discuss their responsibility or change their ways). 
219. Poulson, supra note 139, at 179-80 tbl.1 & fig.1 (relying on four studies of victims). 
One potential confounding factor in all of these studies is that all parties must consent to 
mediation. The cases of those victims or offenders who decline mediation and choose to go to 
court may differ systematically from the cases that enter mediation; for example, the mediation 
participants may be more optimistic and less bitter. Thus, the sample of cases in which all parties 
consent to mediate may be skewed towards those who are already receptive to it and its benefits. 
220. Id. (relying on five studies of offenders). 
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versus 56% of victims in traditional court proceedings.221 Likewise, 84% of 
offenders in mediation were satisfied with the handling of their cases, 
versus 73% of offenders in court.222 Those in mediation are more likely to 
have a chance to tell their stories (94% versus 64% of victims, and 88% 
versus 64% of offenders).223 They are also more likely to feel that their 
opinions were adequately considered (94% versus 92% of victims, and 72% 
versus 55% of offenders).224 They are more likely to feel that the judge or 
mediator was fair in their particular case (88% versus 76% of victims, and 
91% versus 63% of offenders).225 Those in mediation are more likely to feel 
that the outcome was fair and satisfactory (73% versus 54% of victims, and 
77% versus 67% of offenders).226 They are also more likely to believe that 
the offender was held accountable (92% versus 71% of victims, and 82% 
versus 49% of offenders).227 In mediation, offenders are more likely to 
apologize (74% versus 29%), victims are more likely to forgive (43% 
versus 22%), and victims are less likely to remain upset (28% versus 57%) 
or fear revictimization (15% versus 34%).228   
Finally, and most importantly, mediation seems to reduce recidivism. A 
meta-analysis of fifteen studies found that juvenile offenders who take part 
in mediation recidivate up to 26% less than those who go to court.229 When 
juvenile offenders do recidivate after mediation, they commit less severe 
offenses than adjudicated juveniles do.230 Another meta-analysis found that 
in seven out of seven randomized field trials, restorative justice worked at 
least as well as adjudication at preventing recidivism. Two of the seven 
 
221. Id. at 181-82 tbl.2 & fig.2 (relying on six studies of victims). 
222. Id. (relying on five studies of offenders). 
223. Id. at 183-84 tbl.3 & fig.3 (relying on one study of victims and two studies of offenders). 
224. Id. at 185 tbl.4 & fig.4 (relying on one study of victims and one study of offenders). 
225. Id. at 186-87 tbl.5 & fig.5 (relying on one study of victims and two studies of offenders). 
226. Id. at 193 tbl.9 & fig.9 (relying on one study of victims and offenders). 
227. Id. at 188-89 tbl.6 & fig.6 (relying on two studies of victims and two studies of 
offenders). 
228. Id. at 190-91 tbl.7 & fig.7 (relying, for apology and forgiveness statistics, on one study 
of victims and four studies of offenders); id. at 196-98 tbls.11-12 & figs.11-12 (relying, for upset-
victim statistics, on two studies and, for fear-of-revictimization statistics, on four studies); see 
Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 29-30 figs.2-3, 40 fig.12 (finding that 72% of victims 
received apologies in conferences, compared with 19% of victims in court; that 5% of victims in 
conferences feared revictimization by the offender, compared with 18% of those in court; and that 
the percentage of victims who feared offenders dropped from 20% before conferences to 9% 
afterwards).  
229. Victim-offender mediation “participation is associated with a reduction in delinquent 
behavior,” particularly if one defines delinquency to mean commission of the same offense again. 
William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and 
Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 164. “In 
terms of effect size, the reduction in reoffense may be as great as 26% relative to non-VOM 
participants.” Id. at 162.  
230. Id. at 160-61, 164 (finding that this reduction was large and statistically significant, but 
cautioning that few of the studies had addressed the severity of reoffense issue). 
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trials found that it clearly reduced recidivism.231 Other studies confirm that 
mediation participants are less likely to recidivate and that, when they do 
recidivate, they commit less serious offenses.232 One must read the data 
cautiously, because many of these studies focused on juveniles and because 
some studies found no significant effects. Even so, the results are 
promising. On the whole, these programs seem to leave both victims and 
offenders more satisfied and better off. 
Thus, the law ought to make mediation more widely available. From 
arrest to incarceration, both parties should have easy access to and notice of 
victim-offender mediation, so they can use it whenever the time is right.233 
The court system should supply trained mediators free of charge. 
Stenographers would transcribe the mediation so that judges could later use 
the transcripts at sentencing.234 The mediation would be at a time and place 
most convenient and comfortable to everyone involved. It need not take 
place in a courthouse or during business hours, but could be in a school, 
church, or home in the evening or on a weekend.235 Offenders would suffer 
no penalty for remaining silent or refusing to mediate. They could, 
however, choose to show judges at sentencing that they had apologized and 
begun to reform. 
Each side could engage in as much or as little mediation as it liked. In 
some cases, of course, a traumatized victim or stubborn offender would 
refuse entirely. Thus, victims of sex crimes or violence might often be 
afraid or unwilling to take part. Interestingly, however, mediation seems to 
work even better to reduce violent crimes than property crimes.236 Perhaps 
the stronger emotions in these cases produce more powerful remorse and 
empathy, which in turn may reduce recidivism.237 A mugging victim, for 
 
231. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 38-39. 
232. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 171-73 (summarizing the results of several English studies 
of mediation involving adults, as well as the more numerous mediation programs for youths).  
233. Some jurisdictions are already moving in this direction. See supra text accompanying 
notes 184-188. 
234. One could imagine also making the transcripts available to juries, but this might 
encourage self-serving statements or silence in cases that might head to trial. One might also 
condition admissibility on the consent of the parties, at least at the guilt stage. Otherwise, defense 
lawyers might have to advise their clients to remain silent lest they hurt their cases and prejudice 
their Fifth Amendment rights. Unless all parties consented, the transcripts could remain sealed and 
confidential. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 408 (making settlement offers and discussions inadmissible “to 
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount,” except when the statement is being 
used for another purpose). 
235. See Luna, supra note 71, at 299. 
236. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 40.  
237. Id.; see also, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Victim’s Son Is Given Award for Forgiving 
Father’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A26 (reporting that death row inmates banded 
together to award a scholarship to a son who forgave his father’s murderer); Cheryl Wetzstein, 
Restorative Justice Lets Inmates Make Peace with Victims; Bible-Based Program Wins Converts, 
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at A2 (noting forceful speeches in favor of restorative justice by the 
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example, might be anxious to learn why the mugger targeted her and be 
relieved to learn that she was only a random target. But because violent 
offenders and victims of violence may be reluctant, mediation may happen 
most often for nonviolent property crimes. And as our description implies, 
mediation should supplement but not supplant the criminal process. 
Mediation should be not a soft escape from or alternative to punishment, 
but an adjunct. The outcome of mediation might influence sentencing 
judges, as Section F discusses, but it should not preempt sentencing 
entirely. 
The biggest danger here might be forcing reluctant offenders and 
victims into mediation. While most victims like and are satisfied with 
mediation, a significant minority (perhaps a quarter to a third) are not.238 
The decision to mediate ought to be voluntary; while persuasion and 
inducement are appropriate, coercion is not. Officials must judiciously 
respect offenders’ and victims’ free choices not to participate, whether out 
of self-interest, fear, or anger. Thus, parties should suffer no penalties for 
refusing to mediate. There would still be some equality concerns, as when 
offenders lose the possible benefits of mediation because victims refuse to 
take part, but this risk is a tolerable one. 
C. Cooperating Witnesses 
Prosecutors frequently convince offenders to flip and become 
cooperating witnesses. Cooperators often tape-record conversations, 
provide information, and testify against their former co-conspirators and 
associates. Frequently, witnesses and lawyers treat cooperation agreements 
strictly as business arrangements, in which cooperators help with 
investigations and testimony in exchange for reduced sentences or 
money.239 This mercenary approach leads to worries about the truthfulness 
of cooperators’ testimony; the fear is that they will lie or embellish to 
please prosecutors and earn rewards.240 
Prosecutors, however, can use their existing discretion differently. 
When persuading offenders to cooperate, they can emphasize that offenders 
 
mother of one murder victim and the wife of another murder victim, whose daughter was also 
raped). 
238. See Braithwaite, supra note 70, at 21-22 (collecting statistics on victim satisfaction of 
restorative justice programs). 
239. See Simons, supra note 24, at 22-26 (explaining the utilitarian model of cooperation). 
240. See, e.g., Symposium, The Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable?, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 747 (2002); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and 
Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 292 (1996); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and 
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999). 
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have committed shameful deeds and must right their wrongs.241 One 
powerful sales pitch is to stress making amends by joining the good guys 
with the white hats—“Team America,” as one prominent former federal 
prosecutor called it.242 Put another way, prosecutors can do much to 
emphasize the moral side of cooperation. Though offenders have acted 
badly, many still know at some level that they ought to be ashamed and 
recognize a need to atone. The most powerful way to undo a wrong is not 
only to renounce it, but to help bring it to justice. Repenting, apologizing, 
and making amends are important components of cooperation.243 These 
very elements show up in the written cooperation agreements that 
prosecutors and cooperators make. Cooperation agreements often require 
cooperators to admit guilt, plead guilty (to every crime committed, in some 
districts), tell no lies, and make restitution.244 
These actions not only help cooperators to expiate their crimes, but also 
bring valuable practical benefits. They break down cooperators’ self-
identification with the criminal element and strengthen moral norms. The 
moral dimension reinforces the practical rewards for providing candid and 
complete information. Crawling out of the web of lies and crime can be 
morally satisfying, counteracting to some extent the temptation to concoct 
false testimony. The moral transformation may make offenders humbler, 
readier to admit their wrongs, and so more credible to juries.245 Thus, their 
testimony may be more compelling, adding a practical benefit to the 
psychic rewards of morality for its own sake.246 
Once again, this use of prosecutorial discretion raises the dangers of 
discrimination and abuse of power. But these dangers are inherent in 
existing prosecutorial discretion; remorse and apology make them no 
worse. On the contrary, by guiding prosecutorial decisions, remorse and 
apology may make these decisions more consistent and fair. 
 
241. As Erik Luna puts it, “[G]enuine remorse is a prerequisite to the moral development of 
the offender. Without understanding the impropriety of his conduct, he may retain a deviant 
identity and connection to an antisocial subculture.” Luna, supra note 71, at 294. 
242. Katyal, supra note 41, at 1356 n.186 (quoting Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for 
the SDNY).   
243. Simons, supra note 24, at 41 (following Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 
9, at 1810-29). 
244. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 240, at 953 (reporting that if cooperators lie, they risk 
having prosecutors “rip[] up their cooperation agreement[s]” and losing their bargains). The point 
in the text also accords with the first author’s experience as a federal prosecutor. 
245. One former federal prosecutor explained to one of us in an interview that “obviously 
remorseful” cooperators, in his experience, were “much more likely to be effective witnesses” 
because their testimony seemed to juries “much less mechanical and less calculated” and they 
appeared much more “affected by what they had done.” Interview with Paul Engelmayer, supra 
note 157. 
246. Simons, supra note 24, at 49-50. 
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D. Extending Victims’ Rights 
Currently, a criminal case is a duel between the state and the defendant. 
Victims are often interviewed and called to testify, and sometimes they 
even have a right to make a statement at sentencing. Fundamentally, 
however, their role is minor and reactive. Police and prosecutors run the 
show; victims lose control when they are victimized and again when their 
cases disappear into the criminal justice system. Often, they do not even 
learn that an offender has been charged, offered a plea bargain, convicted at 
trial, or sentenced, or they learn these things long after the fact.247 
There is an extensive literature debating the pros and cons of victims’ 
rights, and we do not want to wade into that broader debate here. Victims’ 
bills of rights often guarantee victims fair treatment, protection from the 
accused, restitution, notice of court proceedings and outcomes, and 
attendance at court proceedings.248 Nothing in our proposals would abridge 
these rights. Victims would not have to enter mediation, for example, 
particularly if they felt threatened or uncomfortable. Our point is simply 
that victims now have no structured opportunity to meet with defendants, 
express forgiveness, and heal. This hurts both parties. Many states do allow 
victims to speak at sentencing, but as noted earlier, sentencing is not 
structured to allow direct, open interaction. At sentencing both victim and 
defendant face forward and speak to the judge. For the defendant to face the 
victim, he would literally have to turn his back on the judge.249 Moreover, 
sentencing frequently is a drama scripted by lawyers for the benefit of a 
judge rather than an opportunity to speak from the heart. 
Our approach tries to transcend the criticism that victims’ rights 
measures must be vengeful and anti-defendant. Currently, the most that a 
victim might do is to argue for a stiff sentence. This focus regrettably turns 
victims’ rights into a zero-sum game, as if the only way to make victims 
happy is to impose stiffer punishments at the expense of offenders. Victims’ 
 
247. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 21-23 (1999) 
(discussing victims’ alienation from the criminal justice process); TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 42, 
at 36-38 (discussing the continued problems faced by victims in receiving notification of 
important proceedings and outcomes in their cases). Prosecutors sometimes consult with victims’ 
families in deciding whether to seek the death penalty, though even here consultation may be 
sporadic or even limited to the families of victims who are white. See PREJEAN, supra note 17, at 
240 (citing DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., CHATTAHOOCHEE JUDICIAL DISTRICT: BUCKLE OF THE 
DEATH BELT: THE DEATH PENALTY IN MICROCOSM (1991), at “Victims’ Families: A Contrast in 
Black and White,” available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=540). 
248. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b) (2000); see also Beloof, supra note 31, at 289 & n.2, 294 
& n.29 (noting that the vast majority of states enshrine victims’ rights in their constitutions or 
statutes and that these rights typically guarantee fairness, dignity, and respect by giving victims 
notice, the right to attend, and the right to speak with prosecutors and judges, and that they 
sometimes also include rights to privacy and protection). 
249. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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rights to participate could be more constructive, however. Studies suggest 
that most victims are far less vengeful and punitive than most lawyers 
assume.250 Empirical research finds that victims criticize the criminal justice 
system not because it is too lenient but because they have few rights and 
play little role in the process.251 
Victims do not want vengeance so much as additional rights to 
participate. First, and above all else, they would like information about their 
cases.252 In one survey, more than four-fifths of victims thought it very 
important to receive information about arrests, grand jury proceedings, bail, 
and release dates.253 While 83% of people surveyed considered it very 
important for victims to be informed, officials tell few victims of arrests, 
and only 42% of those victims are kept informed of police investigations.254 
Even those who learn of a suspect’s arrest rarely receive notice of most 
further proceedings.255 Nor do many receive notice of their rights to make 
statements and discuss cases with prosecutors.256 
 
250. See Lucia Zedner, Victims, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 419, 443-44 
(Mike Maguire et al. eds., 2002). 
251. See BHARAT B. DAS, VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 126-27, 131 (1997); 
JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19, 207-08 (1996); Joanna 
Shapland, Victims and the Criminal Justice System, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY: 
REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 210, 213 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986); Strang & Sherman, 
supra note 42, at 18-25. 
252. See WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 19 (“The informational needs of victims are often 
identified as the most common need of all victims.”); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 20 
(“Victims repeatedly say that one of the greatest sources of frustration to them is the difficulty in 
finding out from criminal justice authorities about developments in their cases. Indeed, some 
victims have said that is all they want from the justice system and would be satisfied simply to 
achieve that goal.” (footnote omitted)). 
253. DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL 
PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 4 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, NCJ 173839, 
1998), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173839.pdf. 
254. JOHN M. BOYLE, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS/E. REG’L CONFERENCE, CRIME ISSUES IN 
THE NORTHEAST 3 (1999), available at http://www.csgeast.org/pdfs/cv.project.report.pdf (giving 
data from 1998 survey of over 4000 members of the public in nine Northeastern states); see also 
Council of State Gov’ts/E. Reg’l Conference, Sentencing Policy and Victims’ Rights, 
http://www.csgeast.org/crimrights.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2004) (containing data set for survey). 
255. DAS, supra note 251, at 126-27, 131; KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 4 exhibit 1 
(reporting that bond-hearing notification rates are approximately 42% to 63%, bail notification 
rates are approximately 26% to 38%, sentencing-hearing notification rates are about 30% to 56%, 
parole-hearing notification rates are 35% to 70%, plea-negotiation notification rates are 53% to 
58%, and charge-dismissal notification rates are 39% to 42%, and noting that, in each case, the 
lower figure is the rate in states with weak victims’ rights laws and the higher figure is the rate in 
states with strong victims’ rights laws). 
256. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 5 exhibit 2 (reporting that victims are notified of 
the following rights at the following rates: 47% to 71% are told that victim services are available, 
41% to 70% are told of their right to discuss their cases with the prosecutor, 42% to 72% are told 
of their right to make victim-impact statements, and 36% to 62% are told of their right to make 
victim-impact statements at parole hearings, and noting that, in each case, the lower figure is the 
rate in states with weak victims’ rights laws and the higher figure is the rate in states with strong 
victims’ rights laws). 
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Second, many victims want to participate in their cases beyond simply 
testifying as witnesses.257 More than 75% of victims in the survey just 
mentioned thought it very important to be involved or heard in bail 
hearings, dismissals of charges, plea discussions, parole hearings, and 
sentencings.258 “[A]lthough victims’ desire is to be included in the criminal 
justice process, they have no desire to take control of the case.”259 Rather, 
simply by taking part, victims begin to recover emotionally, counteracting 
the alienation and powerlessness they may feel.260 
Third, victims value emotional healing and apology.261 Most victims 
want to tell offenders how their crimes affected them and hear offenders 
answer their questions about the offense.262 Confronting the offender in 
person is an important component of this emotional interaction. One victim 
who went through mediation said, “I liked that the kid had to look me in the 
eyes.”263 Another said, “I guess being able to meet him face to face and 
realize that he was just a kid who made a mistake was what I liked the 
most.”264 Face-to-face mediation reassures victims, greatly reducing their 
fears that the offender will victimize them again.265 Victims want face-to-
face apologies so that they can understand why their crimes happened to 
them, release their anger, and regain a sense of control and self-esteem.266 
When offenders accept responsibility, express remorse, and apologize, 
victims can more easily heal, reconcile, and forgive.267 
Fourth, victims often desire monetary restitution.268 While victims’ 
rights laws purport to guarantee it, fewer than twenty percent of victims in 
fact receive any restitution.269 Typically, the problem is not that defendants 
 
257.  JOANNA SHAPLAND ET AL., VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 176-78 (1985); 
Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 21-22. 
258. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 4. 
259. WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 208.  
260. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 21. 
261. HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 88-118 
(2002); Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 22-23. 
262. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 165, 188; Mark S. Umbreit, Mediating Victim-Offender 
Conflict: From Single-Site to Multi-Site Analysis in the U.S., in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: 
PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH 
PERSPECTIVES 431, 433 tbl.1 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1991) (noting that ninety-
two percent of victims who went through mediation thought that telling offenders about their 
crimes and hearing offenders answer their questions was important, far more than the seventy-six 
percent who emphasized their desire for financial compensation). 
263. Umbreit, supra note 262, at 433. 
264. Id. 
265. UMBREIT, supra note 200, at 189.  
266. Petrucci, supra note 66, at 351-52, 354-56. 
267. See Marilyn R. McNamara & Mandeep K. Dhami, The Role of Apology in Restorative 
Justice 6-7, 9 (June 1-4, 2003), http://www.sfu.ca/cfrj/fulltext/mcnamara.pdf. 
268. Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 23-24. 
269. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 253, at 6. 
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are poor, but that officials know little about the right to restitution, victims’ 
economic losses, or defendants’ assets.270 
Finally, victims want procedural fairness and respect.271 This sense of 
fairness depends more on authorities’ efforts to include victims in the 
process than on case outcomes.272 Victims may complain, for example, that 
police seemed unhelpful or unsympathetic.273 
Except for restitution, these benefits come at little material cost to 
offenders. True, offenders may find apologizing uncomfortable, but 
apologies may cleanse their consciences as well as heal and reconcile 
victims. These various goods that victims want reinforce one another. The 
more victims can follow their cases and have procedural opportunities to 
interact with offenders, the more openings for remorse and apology there 
are. And the more remorse and apology they receive, the more victims feel 
respected and the more likely they may be to receive restitution (pursuant to 
a mediation agreement). 
To promote remorse and apology, criminal procedure should let victims 
participate more actively in all parts of the criminal process and apprise 
them of their rights to do so. Victim-offender mediation, discussed in 
Section B, is one way to give victims a greater role. Another is to offer 
opportunities for offenders, with court supervision and victims’ consent, to 
communicate with victims and make restitution before sentencing. A third 
is to give victims the right to speak with or question offenders at trial or 
plea hearings and at sentencing. Victims could also have the right to 
respond to offenders’ statements at plea hearings and at sentencing. For 
example, a robbery victim might challenge the offender’s suggestion that 
his problem with alcohol or drugs forced him to commit a mugging. These 
challenges might break down denials and evasions, leading to more 
complete catharsis and closure. Indeed, George Fletcher would go so far as 
to give victims the right to veto plea bargains and to question prosecution 
and defense witnesses at trial.274 But victims need not be in the driver’s 
seat. Simply giving them the chance to speak and perhaps question will 
help them to feel respected and heard. 
 
270. Id. at 6, 9-10 (also suggesting that criminal justice officials sometimes view restitution 
as inappropriate). 
271. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 24-25.  
272. WEMMERS, supra note 251, at 208.  
273. DAS, supra note 251, at 123. 
274. FLETCHER, supra note 58, at 193-97, 247-50. We do not embrace this proposal. It goes 
too far toward supplanting punishment by ceding actual control of prosecutorial actions to the 
victim. This would make punishment less a matter of state-imposed suffering to reaffirm the 
community’s moral norms and more one of private revenge and redress between individuals. Cf. 
DUFF, supra note 66, at 60-64 (contending that crimes are properly understood not simply as 
wrongs against victims, but also as public wrongs to which the community should respond). 
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Of course, not all of this would be appropriate in the presence of juries. 
In addition, trial judges would need to regulate the time and manner of 
victim participation to minimize any danger that recalcitrant offenders 
might further wound their victims. Trial judges are more than capable of 
doing so, however. Notice and an opportunity to be heard, the fundamental 
requirements of due process, would empower victims and increase the 
opportunities for apology and reconciliation. 
E. Fixing Plea Procedures 
Right now, guilty plea hearings are often dry recitations of rights and 
facts. Judges advise defendants of a laundry list of procedural rights they 
are waiving, and defendants answer “yes” to indicate that they understand 
each one.275 After that, defendants provide very brief factual statements 
explaining what they did,276 which are often written by their lawyers. 
Defense lawyers may tell their clients to say that they know they did 
something wrong and are sorry. These perfunctory, scripted statements are 
far from full apologies. Plea procedures do little else to encourage remorse or 
apology, particularly because victims and community members are absent. 
These plea hearings could do much more than simply recite rights and 
facts. Judges could use their existing authority to truly judge. They could 
take the time to observe and evaluate defendants. Defendants often deny or 
minimize their behavior or offer excuses.277 Judges could keep them honest 
by questioning them closely, probing their excuses, and refusing to accept 
pleas if defendants denied or evaded guilt.278 For example, they could ask 
questions about defendants’ statements during the crime, how victims 
appeared at the crime, the harm inflicted, and the use of force or weapons. 
These questions could elicit spontaneous responses from defendants, 
breaking them away from scripted statements drafted by their lawyers. 
They would also draw attention to the impact of the crime on the victim and 
reveal defendants’ awareness of and attitudes or indifference toward 
victims. Judges could probe defendants’ explanations for their behavior, 
their remorse or sorrow, and their willingness to apologize sincerely or 
grudgingly. For example, a judge could challenge a rapist’s insinuation that 
the victim consented to sex or was asking for sex by flirting or wearing 
provocative clothing. If victims were present and took part in plea hearings, 
 
275. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)-(c) (requiring judges to advise defendants of a list of 
rights at guilty plea colloquies). 
276. See, e.g., id. 11(b)(3) (requiring a factual basis before a court may accept entry of a 
guilty plea). 
277. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1393-94. 
278. Id. at 1407-08 (proposing restricting or abolishing Alford and nolo contendere pleas). 
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as suggested in the previous Section, judges could encourage dialogue 
between the parties. Judges could encourage victims to describe the crime 
from their perspectives, compare them with the defendants’ versions, and 
listen to defendants’ reactions. Some defendants would deny, hedge, or 
minimize responsibility; others might be resigned or remorseful; still others 
would openly apologize. Of course, defendants or victims might refuse to 
participate. But if they participated, the result might be reconciliation, 
healing, and closure. Judges might also learn information that would be 
useful at sentencing, as the next Section discusses. To make sure that 
sentencing judges have this information, federal courts should end the 
common practice of farming out guilty plea colloquies to magistrates.279 
Instead, the judge who will sentence should hear the plea colloquy. 
One could imagine going further and empanelling a plea jury. The plea 
jury could perhaps question defendants (via the judge or prosecutor), 
probing their statements. The plea jury’s main function, however, would be 
symbolic, representing the community wounded by the crime.280 Perhaps 
the idea of plea juries is too cumbersome to replicate broadly. But for 
serious violent crimes, where identifiable victims have been badly hurt, the 
experiment might be worth trying. 
F. Sentencing 
The one place where remorse and apology currently appear in the 
American criminal justice system is at sentencing. At sentencing, 
defendants sometimes express sorrow and apologize, and victims 
sometimes air their suffering and forgive. By and large, however, 
sentencing is not well structured to promote remorse and apology. In 
theory, a judge can tailor the sentence to reflect a defendant’s degree of 
sincere remorse and repentance. Even the most rigid sentencing scheme 
(the federal one) gives judges discretion to award standardized sentence 
discounts for acceptance of responsibility.281 In practice, however, most 
 
279. See id. at 1410 n.246 (collecting citations to federal cases in which federal district courts 
referred guilty plea hearings to magistrates). 
280. Jason Mazzone has proposed a similar mechanism for a different purpose: plea panels 
with broad power to investigate the voluntariness and fairness of proposed plea bargains. Jason 
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 874-78 (2003). This searching inquiry 
would likely be too burdensome to apply broadly, greatly expanding the time and expense 
required for each plea. Moreover, lay jurors may have neither the ability nor the inclination to 
second-guess the prosecution’s behavior in obtaining pleas. Lay jurors, by contrast, are perfectly 
suited to represent the wounded community and to seek remorse and apology. 
281. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2003). The Supreme Court is 
currently considering whether to invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. 
Booker, No. 04-104 (U.S. filed July 21, 2004), and United States v. Fanfan, No. 04-105 (U.S. 
filed July 21, 2004). The Court’s decision should not affect our point. Even though the Supreme 
Court has restricted judges’ ability to find aggravating facts unilaterally, it has not questioned 
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federal judges award these discounts almost automatically for guilty pleas, 
no matter how grudgingly the defendant admits guilt or how little remorse 
he shows.282 Likewise, while state sentencing schemes preserve judges’ 
discretion to adjust sentences, judges use their discretion not to reward 
remorse but to reward efficiency regardless of remorse. Anecdotal studies 
show that judges reward guilty pleas with sentence discounts not because 
these offenders are more contrite but because they spare the court’s time.283 
We see arguments both ways on whether and how judges should 
consider remorse and apology in determining sentences. One argument is 
that remorse and apology are valuable only as free, unprompted expressions 
of conscience. Ideally, offenders should apologize for apology’s sake rather 
than out of a mercenary desire to reap lower sentences. Indeed, that is 
exactly what happened in medieval and colonial times: A criminal would 
confess, apologize, reconcile with the community, and then hang from the 
gallows that day or the next.284 Commodifying an apology can subvert and 
cheapen it, watering down its force and encouraging insincere, self-
interested apologies.285 Furthermore, it is not easy to measure sincere 
remorse and apology, as many offenders feign remorse to reap sentence 
discounts.286 
On the other hand, these practical objections could just as easily apply 
to other metrics for punishment. An offender’s blameworthiness, need for 
specific deterrence or incapacitation, and amenability to rehabilitation 
require careful factfinding. Offenders often falsely portray themselves as 
less blameworthy, more peaceful, or more virtuous than they are, yet we 
trust sentencing judges to discern their sincerity and honesty. 
Blameworthiness, peacefulness, and virtue are not objectively verifiable 
facts any more than remorse—the practical factfinding problems are no 
 
judges’ power to award mitigating adjustments, such as acceptance-of-responsibility discounts. 
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537-40 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 481, 490 n.16 (2000). 
282. See supra note 18. 
283. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 134, 144-48 (1978) (noting that judges tend to rubber-stamp 
plea agreements primarily to promote efficiency and clear their dockets); Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 661-69 (1981) (explaining that, 
while a few defendants go to trial because they are defiant or in denial, most pleas are motivated 
not by remorse but by pragmatic recognition that they earn substantial sentencing discounts). 
284. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 16-23, 42 (2002) (describing repentance, 
confession, and reconciliation as central elements of and justifications for capital punishment 
around 1700); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 43, 49-
50 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) (same, in the 18th century); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 26 (1993) (“The 
condemned were expected to play the role of the penitent sinner; it was best of all if they offered a 
final confession, a prayer, and affirmed their faith, in the very shadow of the gallows.”). 
285. See Taft, supra note 14, at 1156-57. 
286. See O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1555; see also supra text accompanying note 75. 
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more daunting here. Indeed, anyone who has ever attended a smattering of 
sentencing hearings is familiar with a variety of behavior: Even when they 
have an incentive at sentencing to seem remorseful, some offenders remain 
in denial. Some continue to make excuses for their conduct. Some stiffly 
read statements written by their lawyers. And some display real emotion 
and make heartfelt apologies. Judges must gauge sincerity, but this task is 
similar to trusting judges or juries to determine witnesses’ credibility. 
The harder objection is the theoretical one. Is an expression of remorse 
and apology induced by the hope of sentence discounts worthless? We are 
inclined to think not. Even insincere remorse and apologies may be better 
than none at all. Such expressions vindicate victims, drive home awareness 
of wrongs, and may ultimately lead offenders to internalize that awareness. 
People are reluctant to apologize when they think they are in the right, in 
part because expressing remorse is a step towards accepting and believing 
it.287 The very act of apologizing teaches, which explains why parents make 
their children apologize (grudgingly) for hitting a sibling or taking a toy.288 
In other words, the ordeal of expressing remorse and apologizing, even if 
done initially for the wrong reasons, may in time promote genuine 
repentance.289 Furthermore, victims may find even half-hearted apologies 
satisfying, as they vindicate victims and humble offenders.290 This explains 
why victims negotiate for confessions and apologies as part of settlements 
or plea bargains, even though the apology is an obvious quid pro quo.291 
 
287. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1399, 1399-400 (“[E]ven feigned or induced repentance 
may teach lessons to some offenders[, which can] heighten[] the defendant’s awareness of the 
victim’s injury, the norm violated, and the community’s condemnation. Indeed, the ordeal of 
feigning repentance, even if initially done for the wrong reasons, can sometimes lead to genuine 
repentance.” (footnote omitted)); Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, supra note 9, at 1850.  
288. Bibas, supra note 10, at 1399 n.197 (noting also that cognitive-dissonance theory 
teaches that persons who speak things that they do not fully believe are inclined to update their 
attitudes to bring them into harmony with their statements). While a few apologies may be so 
transparently insincere as to be offensive, or are immediately repudiated, most vindicate the 
victim and repudiate the wrong done and thus do some good.  
289. Id. at 1399-400. 
290. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 94-95 (noting that “an apology whose sincerity is doubtful 
or unknown can still have value,” that “apologies can have a ritual or formalized character,” and 
that “between strangers it might be enough that the apology is made—that the ritual is 
undertaken”). 
291. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 10, at 1407 n.234 (reporting cases in which victim or 
victim’s family insisted on an admission of guilt as a condition of a plea bargain); Taft, supra note 
14, at 1146; Alan Bernstein, Coleman Fined, Issues Apology in Assault Case, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Oct. 11, 2001, at A33 (reporting that victim of a shoving incident “approved Wednesday’s plea 
bargaining because it included an apology,” according to the prosecutor); William Brand, SLA 
Members Face 6-8 Years in Prison; ‘1970s Revolutionary Group’ Pleads Guilty to 2nd-Degree 
Murder in 27-Year-Old Slaying, OAKLAND (Cal.) TRIB., Nov. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, News, 
All (English, Full Text) (reporting that a murder victim’s family had agreed to a plea bargain on 
condition that the four defendants apologize in court, and noting that the four did apologize to the 
victim’s family at sentencing). 
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Earlier, we criticized the status quo’s use of remorse and apology at 
sentencing as proxies for the need for deterrence and retribution. We argued 
that remorse and apology are poor proxies for future dangerousness and 
blameworthiness and that sentence discounts may undermine general 
deterrence.292 While deterrence and retribution are legitimate guideposts for 
sentencing, they do not exhaust the roles of remorse and apology. The other 
benefits of remorse and apology still justify taking them into account at 
sentencing, even if there is some tradeoff of general deterrence and little 
impact on specific deterrence and retribution. Moreover, our criticism of 
deterrence centered on the narrow, classical view of deterrence as making 
the expected pain of punishment exceed the pleasure of the crime.293 
Apology and remorse fit much more comfortably with a social-meaning 
approach to deterrence, such as Kahan’s. By reinforcing the social norms 
violated and morally condemning crimes, apology and remorse may teach 
moral values and discourage crime in the long run.294 
If remorse and apology should carry weight at sentencing, courts need 
more flexibility and information to consider healing as an adjunct to 
punishment. First, they need flexibility to adjust plea discounts instead of 
having to apply one-size-fits-all rewards for guilty pleas. Even under 
longstanding federal law, courts could give the lowest sentences to 
offenders who make unqualified apologies. In contrast, they could impose 
full sentences on those who do not apologize at all or who make excuses 
and award partial reductions for those in between. To make these decisions 
intelligently, the judge who imposes sentence should be the same one who 
heard the trial or plea and should have the transcript of any victim-offender 
mediation sessions. 
One could even imagine having sentencing juries, at least in serious 
violent cases, to represent the conscience of the wounded community. This 
approach dovetails with the Supreme Court’s decision that juries rather than 
judges must find defendants eligible for the death penalty.295 Time and 
money constraints, however, would probably limit sentencing juries to 
serious violent crimes, where the need for them might be greatest.296 
 
292. See supra Section II.A. 
293. The classic exponent of this position is Jeremy Bentham. See BENTHAM, supra note 79, 
at 170 & n.1. 
294. See Kahan, supra note 9, at 603-04 (noting that Kahan’s expressive theory of 
punishment can reinforce deterrence by shaping people’s preferences through moral education). 
295. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
296. See supra text accompanying note 280. But cf. supra note 55 (collecting law review 
articles that propose jury sentencing).  
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have mandated some role for jury fact-finding in 
determinate sentencing. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In practice, however, legislatures and prosecutors are likely to 
circumvent juries through plea bargaining, redrafted sentencing guidelines, and more mandatory 
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The process should not end at sentencing. As Section II.C notes, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota encourage victim-offender mediation in 
prison. After living with the burden of their guilt, offenders who persist in 
denial may apologize later. While we have been unable to find quantitative 
data on the success of these programs, they appear promising. Scholars 
should investigate further, and policymakers should consider replicating 
them on a larger scale. 
G. Costs and Difficulties of Implementing Remorse and Apology 
A few caveats are in order. We recognize that remorse and apology will 
not always work. Some offenders will remain defiant. Some suffer from 
psychopathy, which impairs the capacity to empathize and so feel 
remorse.297 Some victims will be rationally or irrationally fearful of meeting 
with their offenders and reliving the trauma. And some—although 
surprisingly few298—may care little about such expressions and may want 
only vengeance. Remorse and apology are harder to orchestrate for so-
called victimless crimes, such as low-level drug possession crimes, tax 
evasion, or perjury. So, too, certain inchoate crimes, such as conspiracy, 
 
minimum sentences, and many states still use discretionary sentencing. See supra text 
accompanying notes 281-283. Thus, juries are unlikely to play a major role in most cases. See 
Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 333, 338-39 (2004).   
After sentencing, one might also consider time limits on the civil disabilities that confront 
convicted felons, such as disenfranchisement. Some felons, those guilty of the most serious 
felonies, may face death or life imprisonment. But most will reenter society, and society must 
consider when to reintegrate and reconcile with them, to symbolically encourage healing and 
redemption. Perhaps those who demonstrate remorse and apologize show their willingness to turn 
over a new leaf, and their civil disabilities should end at some point after their parole or probation 
ends. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 
65, 67 nn.4-5 (2003) (discussing service by felons on juries and collecting citations to articles 
discussing disenfranchisement of felons). 
297. For general treatments of psychopathy and how it impairs the conscience and the 
capacity to empathize and feel remorse, see generally HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF 
SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY 239-47 
(1941); and ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE 
PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 40-46 (1999). Psychopaths may be able to feign remorse to manipulate 
the system to gain lenient treatment. See, e.g., Dave Cullen, The Depressive and the Psychopath: 
At Last We Know Why the Columbine Killers Did It, SLATE, Apr. 20, 2004, 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2099203/ (explaining that Columbine school shooters Eric Harris, who 
was a psychopath, and Dylan Klebold feigned remorse as part of a diversion program for an 
earlier property crime). 
298. See Strang & Sherman, supra note 42, at 18 (“While individual victims may be angry 
and initially seek vengeance, surveys have repeatedly found that most victims do not have these 
feelings.”). An individual victim’s potential vengeful inclinations, of course, are a concern for any 
proposal that gives victims a role in the criminal process, not just ours. In light of the small 
percentage of victims who harbor these feelings and the proposed supervision of victims’ and 
offenders’ participation, this possibility presents little cause for alarm. 
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often do not concretely harm any readily identifiable victims.299 It may be 
possible, however, to treat affected community residents as victims, as 
many so-called victimless or inchoate crimes have palpable effects on 
neighborhoods and communities.300 Like victimless crimes, other crimes 
will have a diffuse impact on a large group of people, as when a corporation 
recklessly poisons a neighborhood creek. Demands for corporate apologies 
are becoming quite prevalent, and the desire for apologies confirms 
apology’s power even for less discrete crimes.301 Evidently, apology is 
powerful and desirable even if it must be addressed to a broad audience or 
to a representative sample of all victims. For example, a corporate 
embezzler could apologize in person to a sample of corporate employees 
and shareholders and include a written apology in the company’s annual 
report. 
Remorse and apology may vary depending on the cultural context and 
social fabric. In some neighborhoods, the social fabric may be weaker and 
so harder to mend. Some offenders, such as aliens who are to be deported, 
cannot be reintegrated into society. Some offenders’ and victims’ 
relationships are nonexistent or badly frayed and difficult to repair. 
Remorse and apology can nonetheless vindicate victims, teach them that the 
crimes were not their fault, and heal both victims and offenders. Remorse 
and apology may be most powerful in small, close-knit communities and 
homogeneous cultures.302 But even in large, heterogeneous communities, 
remorse and apology still hold some power; in large American cities people 
also care about their relationships and reputations.303 
Moreover, encouraging remorse and apology takes time and money. 
More time and money spent here means less elsewhere, with fewer crimes 
 
299. This is by no means true for all inchoate crimes. Attempted murders, attempted 
muggings, attempted burglaries, and the like all cause at least psychological (if not physical or 
monetary) harm to easily ascertainable victims. Victims of such attempts, like victims of 
completed crimes, will be proper objects of remorse and apology for both their own and their 
offenders’ sakes. See, e.g., supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting example of a successful 
mediation session between an attempted murderer and his victim). 
300. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 66, at 113 (noting that for crimes that injure the community, 
the offender owes the wider community “an apology that recognizes the nature and seriousness of 
the wrong done”); id. at 162 (“[Where] there is no individual victim who could take part in the 
[criminal mediation] process . . . the negotiation must be between the offender and the community 
as a whole . . . .”).  
301. See, e.g., Lisa Bannon, Slave-Labor Suit Targets Japanese Firms; Case Alleges That 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi Abused Chinese in World War II, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2000, at A18; 
Martin J. Moylan, Travel Group Presses Northwest for Apology, DULUTH (Minn.) NEWS-TRIB., 
Jan. 20, 2004, available at 2004 WL 56722804.  
302. See Massaro, supra note 68, at 1916-17. 
303. See DUFF, supra note 66, at 93 (noting that, even where victim and offender are not 
directly or previously related, “[r]econciliation is still valuable since it restores those bonds of 
citizenship, of mutual respect and concern, that the crime damaged”); Whitman, supra note 193, 
at 1068, 1064-68 (arguing that shaming sanctions are “likely to work . . . even in a modern, 
western, urban society,” because they will still “have a real psychic impact”). 
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and defendants investigated, prosecuted, and convicted. Giving a 
meaningful role to offenders, victims, and communities means loosening 
the control of prosecutors and defense lawyers. These are real costs, but the 
value of remorse and apology may well outweigh them. At the very least, 
we should begin to discuss when these costs are worthwhile. 
Other critics will object that remorse and apology seem like 
communitarian impositions of morality in our libertarian political culture. 
While it is important as a rule to respect citizens’ freedom of conscience, 
offenders have proven by their criminal acts that they do not respect 
victims’ rights. The criminal justice system already tries to teach them 
lessons, whether through a crude cost-benefit deterrence calculus or through 
rehabilitation. Encouraging offenders to learn the value of the rights they 
have violated by asking them to acknowledge and repudiate their crimes 
hardly seems a totalitarian invasion of conscience. This is particularly true 
because the lesson taught is limited to that narrow set of acts that society 
has defined as crimes. Offenders and victims, moreover, are always free to 
refuse to participate. 
Of course apology will not be a panacea, and of course there will be 
practical problems, such as divining sincerity and coaxing offenders and 
victims to meet. Including the community will also take some work; news 
articles could publicize apologies to the affected community, and 
community representatives could attend court proceedings. Lawyers who 
are used to litigation will take some time to warm up to mediation, just as 
they have done in the civil context. Once sentencing benefits, evidentiary 
privileges, and procedural reforms encourage this mediation, lawyers may 
slowly learn how to benefit their clients by using these new tools. Properly 
done, remorse and apology can supplement our traditional adversary 
criminal process without supplanting its procedures, rights, and duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers, schooled in law and economics, are taught to evaluate 
settlements from a rational-actor perspective. We add up the monetary 
benefits, subtract the monetary costs, and arrive at a net present value. Of 
course, monetary costs and benefits matter a great deal, and 
consequentialism is certainly relevant. But the ordinary person does not 
evaluate crime and punishment that way.304 Blame, status, and expressive 
concerns matter to the ordinary person, and crime estranges offenders from 
 
304. Cf. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New 
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 96-101, 121-22 (1997) (finding that lawyers 
are less susceptible to framing effects than nonlawyers and attributing this difference to lawyers’ 
training in measuring the expected economic value of various options). 
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victims and society. Criminal punishment is one essential part of balancing 
the scales of justice, but it is not the only part. Offenders should also realize 
the wrongfulness of their acts, feel sorrow for their misdeeds, and accept 
responsibility. If offenders can express remorse to victims and ask their 
forgiveness, they humble themselves and thereby come clean. This humility 
teaches offenders valuable moral lessons. If encouraged in the right way, 
remorse and apology can help offenders cleanse their consciences and 
return to the moral fold. It can also touch victims, allowing them to achieve 
catharsis, let go of their anger, and forgive. 
More generally, criminal procedure can broaden its horizons beyond 
the narrow procedural values of efficiency, accuracy, and procedural 
fairness. It can take account of the social and relational dimensions of 
criminal wrongdoing. Substantive values such as moral education, 
catharsis, healing, and reconciliation should inform procedural choices. In 
the case of remorse and apology, about which the criminal law cares 
deeply, procedure can and should make more room for the substantive 
values that these expressions serve. Victims should have more opportunities 
for face-to-face, dyadic interaction with offenders, especially through 
mediation and similar mechanisms. Prosecutors and defense counsel should 
warm to the social and psychological benefits of remorse and apology. 
They should encourage and use these expressions throughout the criminal 
process, from informal resolution early on to more effective plea 
agreements to better use of cooperating witnesses at trial. Plea and 
sentencing procedures themselves should look beyond the offender’s 
individual badness. They should take greater account of the social, 
psychological, and relational aspects of crime by making room for remorse 
and apology and involving victims and community members. Procedure, in 
short, should serve substance instead of ignoring its goals. 
Remorse and apology are fundamentally moral, and the law cannot 
force them. Offenders and victims enjoy freedom of conscience, and they 
have the right to remain defiant. But the law can remove roadblocks to 
remorse, provide opportunities and venues, and encourage offenders and 
victims to speak face to face. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges can 
all come to see themselves as players in a human moral drama and not 
simply as assembly-line processors of fungible, criminally disposed 
individuals. Perhaps this vision is idealistic, but the examples of civil and 
victim-offender mediation show that reality can pursue the ideal in at least 
some cases. The criminal justice system should aspire to these ideals even if 
it cannot implement them overnight. 
 
